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CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE CHINA PROBLEM
MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH*

ABSTRACT
The central problem confronting climate change scholars and
policymakers is how to create incentives for China and the United States to
make prompt, large emissions reductions. China recently surpassed the
United States as the largest greenhouse gas emitter, and its projected
future emissionsfar outstrip those of any other nation. Although the United
States has been the largest emitter for years, China's emissions have
enabled critics in the United States to argue that domestic reductions will
be ineffective and will transfer jobs to China. These two aspects of the
China Problem, Chinese emissions and their influence on the political
process in the United States, result in a mutually supportive but ultimately
destructive dance between the two countries. This Article argues that a
post-Kyoto internationalagreement and other measures are necessary but
will not create sufficient incentives to induce China, and ultimately the
United States, to act. Instead, the Article draws on the fact that the United
States and Europe accountfor 41% of Chinese exports to propose a novel
means of changing both countries' incentives. The article suggests that
private or public schemes in the United States and Europe to disclose
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product carbon emissions and corporate carbon footprints can create
consumer and other pressure that will induce firms to impose supply-chain
requirements on Chinese and other suppliers. This form of global private
governance can create market-based incentives for China and the United
States to reduce emissions directly and to make credible emissionsreduction commitments in the post-Kyoto era.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Our general stance is that China will not commit to any quantified
emissions reduction targets, but that does not mean we will not assume
responsibilitiesin respondingto climate change."
- Ma Kai, head of Chinese National Development
and Reform Commission, June 4, 2007'
"This is a challenge that requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and the
rest of the world's. The world's second-largestemitter of greenhouse gases
is China. Yet, China was entirely exempted from the requirements of the
Kyoto Protocol."
- President George W. Bush, June 11, 20012
"[T]he United States should not be a signatory to any
protocol.., which would ...mandate new commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions ...unless the protocol or other agreement also
mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Partieswithin the same
compliance period......
- U.S. Senate Resolution 98, 19973

In England, a leading grocery store recently sold small trays of baby
asparagus, baby carrots, and other minivegetables neatly tied in bundles
with a chive. The chives were grown in England and flown to Nairobi,
Kenya, where workers tied them around the minivegetables and placed
them in plastic trays also flown in from outside Nairobi. The minivegetable
bundles were then shrink-wrapped and flown back to grocery stores in
England, where customers purchased them oblivious to their 8500 mile
1. Jim Yardley & Andrew C. Revkin, China Issues Plan on Global Warming, Rejecting
Mandatory Caps on Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at A12 (quoting Ma Kai, head of
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission).
2. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Global
Climate Change (June 11, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/
20010611-2.html.
3. S.Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
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journey. 4
The largest potato chip producer in England buys potatoes by weight.5
Farmers respond to the incentive to sell heavy potatoes by keeping the
potatoes in humidified warehouses, using large amounts of energy and
emitting large amounts of carbon dioxide in the process.' The moist, heavy
potatoes are then transported, again using large amounts of energy. 7 When
the potatoes arrive at the potato chip producer, the producer uses yet more
energy during the potato-cooking
process to remove the water that was
8
carefully retained by the farmers.
This Article examines how overcoming the types of consumer and
firm information shortcomings at the root of these examples may resolve
the most fundamental problem facing the public international system: how
to create sufficient incentives to induce China, the United States, and other
nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 9 The coercive command-andcontrol approaches that dominated the first twenty years of domestic
environmental law in the United States are not available at the global level.
International trade rules render many trade sanctions and subsidies
unavailable. The cap-and-trade measures that have dominated domestic
environmental law in recent years require participation by most if not all of
the principal players. The limited gains that will be achieved even by
successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrate the need to

4.

FELICITY LAWRENCE, NOT ON THE LABEL: WHAT REALLY GOES INTO THE FOOD ON YOUR

PLATE 87 (2004) (describing baby vegetable trays sold at Marks & Spencer).
5. See CARBON TRUST, CARBON FOOTPRINTS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: THE NEXT STEP FOR
BUSINESS
11,
13 fig.8 (2006), available at http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/publications/
publicationdetail.htm?metaNoCache=l&productid=CTC6l6&metaNoCache=I (noting a case study of
water content of potatoes supplied to Walkers). See also Sarah Murray, Op-Ed., The Deep-Fried Truth,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at A41 (noting that the humid conditions in which potatoes are stored, sold
and transported to potato chip manufacturers contributes more to the manufacturer's carbon footprint

than does distribution from the manufacturer).
6. See Murray, supra note 5.
7. CARBON TRUST, supra note 5, at 13 fig.8. A gallon of water weighs roughly eight and onethird pounds. See Charles Fishman, Message in a Bottle, FAST COMPANY, July/Aug. 2007, at 111, 112,
available at http://www.fastcompany.contmagazine/II7/features-message-in-a-bottle.html.
Fishman

notes that each year thousands of gallons of bottled water are shipped from Fiji, where water is scarce,
to the United States, where it is plentiful. Id. at 113.
8. CARBON TRUST, supra note 5, at 13.
9. See, e.g., SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 93, 162-64 (2007) [hereinafter BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?] (noting the need for and
difficulty of creating incentives, and proposing uniform technology specifications to promote diffusion
of low-carbon technologies); Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and
the United States 3, 22 (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 352, 2007)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Complex Climate Change] (describing the need for incentives for the United
States and China to restrict their greenhouse gas emissions).
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0
bring the largest emitters to the table.'

To evaluate the incentives for China and the United States, this Article
begins by examining China's unwillingness to commit to and implement
greenhouse gas emission reductions, which this Article refers to as the
China Problem." Although the issue could just as easily be characterized
as the "China-U.S. Problem," the greatest threat over the long term is the
projected growth in China's emissions.12 Despite taking a number of
measures to reduce emissions,' 3 China recently passed the United States as
the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world,' 4 and China's
emissions are projected to increase at a more rapid rate than those of any
other major emitter over the next several decades. 15 Current Chinese
emissions are sufficiently large that it may not be possible to reduce the
risk of catastrophic climate change without reductions from China. 16 In
fact, China's projected emissions are so large that, when added to the
greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere, Chinese emissions alone may
be sufficient to trigger catastrophic climate change even if all other
countries approach near-zero emissions levels.' 7 At the same time, China's
10.

See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS

OF GLOBAL WARMING 152 (2000) (concluding that the Kyoto Protocol would only reduce expected
warming by 0.03 degrees Celsius by 2100).
II.
China and the United States, the two largest emitters, not only have declined to commit to
reductions but have attempted to undermine the efforts of other governments to date. See infra notes
88-90 and 113-15 and accompanying text.
12. The United States has emitted more carbon dioxide in the aggregate than China, but it is far
easier to reduce emissions than to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Reducing prospective
Chinese emissions is thus a more promising strategy for reducing the threat of global warming than
capturing and sequestering existing U.S. emissions from the atmosphere. See generally Sunstein,
Complex Climate Change, supra note 9 (examining the incentives of the United States and China).
13. For a review of the steps China has taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, see CTR. FOR
CLEAN AIR POLICY, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION IN BRAZIL, CHINA AND INDIA: SCENARIOS AND
OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH 2025, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8-12 (2006), available at

http://www.ccap.org/intemational/Conclusions-Developing%20Country.pdf. The review concludes that
China has achieved a level of reduction that is "equal to or better than the level of reduction projected to
be achieved by the U.S. under its voluntary emissions intensity target .... Id. at 7.
14. Gas Exchange: C02 Emissions 1990-2006, 447 NATURE 1038, 1038 (2007) [hereinafter Gas
Exchange]. See also Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at Al (noting that the International Energy Agency had indicated that
China could pass the United States as the largest emitter by the end of 2007).
15. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2006, at 93 tbl.AI0 (2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/ieoreftabl0.pdf.
16. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
17. Estimates suggest that carbon dioxide emissions should be reduced to only 200/-40% of
currert levels to avoid doubling atmospheric concentrations in order to reduce the risk of catastrophic
climate change. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. China, however, currently comprises more
than 20% of global carbon dioxide emissions and is on course to approach 40%. See infra notes 36-44
and accompanying text. In the absence of major reductions between now and 2050, China alone may
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massive coal reserves, low per capita income, and the delayed effects of
climate change provide incentives for China to maintain recent emissions
18
trends.
The second aspect of the China Problem is a political problem in the
United States that is exacerbated by China's position on greenhouse gas
emissions. If we assume that it is in the interest of the United States to
reduce its emissions,' 9 China's position on emissions contributes to the
inability of the political process in the United States to pursue the national
interest. China's position not only undermines the value to the United
States of reducing emissions, but it also provides opponents of emissions
reductions with powerful rhetorical tools. Opponents can point to economic
competition from China as well as the futility of reducing emissions in the
face of Chinese increases. Opponents also can resist unilateral domestic
20
efforts because of the need for leverage in international negotiations
while never actually placing substantial pressure on China to reduce its
emissions. 21 The political aspects of the China Problem are evident from
statements made by sources as divergent as President George W. Bush,
the U.S. Senate, 23 and the dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts in the
recent Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court.2 4 In turn, the unwillingness of the United States to
cause global carbon dioxide emissions to exceed the target 20-/o-40% of current emissions.
18. See infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
19. This is a contestable but reasonable assumption. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying
text.
20. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
21.
See, e.g., John M. Broder, At Meeting About Global Warming, Bush Does Not Specify Goals,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at A7 (noting that President Bush rejected "mandatory targets for capping
carbon dioxide emissions" for all countries at a September 28, 2007 meeting among China and other
major emitting countries).
22. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush and Australian
Prime Minister Howard Discuss U.S.-Australian Trade Cooperation Treaty in Joint Press Availability
(Sept. 4, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070904-10.html
(noting that President George W. Bush stated on September 5, 2007 that "in order for there to be an
effective climate change policy, China needs to be at the table"). See also infra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text.
23. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REc. S5623 (daily ed. June 12, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Byrd); Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., Domenici Statement on
White House Global Climate Change Initiative (May 31, 2007), available at http://energy.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleaseid=fI d7f~e2-7017-479f-8d I1-7b05
a89f2dc6&Month=5&Year=2007&Party=l ("It is my belief that this problem cannot be solved by the
U.S. itself. We must engage China, India, and other developing nations to be active partners with us. If
we don't do so, we could place our nation at an economic disadvantage and our efforts would likely be
ineffective at reducing emissions.").
24. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1469-70 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the EPA that China's emissions levels present a standing problem).
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25
commit to mandatory reductions buttresses China's position.

The complex pas de deux between China and the United States
benefits opponents of near-term reductions in both countries. Yet if the
concerns about catastrophic climate change are well-founded, this dance is
in neither the global interest nor the interest of the United States. 26 Even
China, although it stands to benefit tremendously from the economic
growth that is generating its increased emissions,
may face substantial net
27
costs if catastrophic climate change occurs.
Recent treatments of this topic by academicians, policymakers, and
the media have suggested that national governments take a variety of steps
to shift China's incentives, including subsidizing China through excess
allowances in a post-Kyoto global carbon trading scheme, subsidizing
Chinese adoption of less carbon-intensive 28 energy production, facilitating
the development and adoption of new technologies, and acting unilaterally
in the hope that China will reciprocate. 29 This Article suggests that it may
25. See Dean Scott, Senators Cite Growing Supportfor Cap; European Officials Call for U.S.
Leadership, 186 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-7, A-8 (Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that Danish Minister for the
Environment Connie Hedegaard stated in a meeting with U.S. senators that "China, India, and other
developing countries will not do anything [without] U.S. leadership"). More recently, the Bush
Administration has announced a policy of leveling off U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but the leveling
off would not occur until 2025 and the commitment will only be included in an international agreement
if other major emitting countries such as China also agree to limits. See Press Release, White House
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Climate Change (Apr. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080416-6.html.
26. 1 assume that it is in the global interest to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by an amount
necessary to reduce the risks of catastrophic climate change. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C.
Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1679-85 (2007) (discussing the
relationship between emissions and climate change, and the potential harms of global warming). See
also infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
28. For brevity I use the terms "carbon" and "greenhouse gases" interchangeably, although I
recognize that many greenhouse gases include more than just carbon, and some, such as nitrous oxide,
do not include carbon.
29.
See, e.g., ScoTr BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 16-18 (2003) [hereinafter BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND
STATECRAFT] (examining strategic options); RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER,
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 102-04 (2003) (discussing the need for side

payments from developed countries to major emitting developing countries to encourage the latter's
participation in an emission reduction scheme); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change
Justice 9 n.53 (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 354, 2007)
(noting that unilateral action by the United States could spur action by other nations); Sunstein,
Complex Climate Change, supra note 9, at 4, 5 (noting that "the best alternative is to convince either or
both nations that they have a moral obligation to act to protect those nations that are most vulnerable"
and that "unilateral action by the United States might well turn out to be feasible, through some
combination of confusion, hope, and a sense of moral responsibility"). For a recent discussion of
remedial options in the public media, see Thomas L. Friedman, The Power of Green, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
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be possible to shift China's incentives by stimulating the private provision
of public goods, drawing on the global private governance literature to
suggest how information provision in developed countries can generate
market pressure that will increase China's incentives to reduce emissions.
In particular, the information can induce private firms in the United States,
Europe, and other developed countries to direct supply-chain contracting
pressure toward their suppliers, including suppliers in developing countries.
To the extent buyers demand lower carbon-intensity goods in new
contracts, supply-chain contracting pressure can be coercive without being
punitive. It also can provide private market subsidies to the extent
corporate buyers are willing to pay a price premium for low-carbon goods
or share information about efficiency enhancements and new technologies.
The potential for influence is large: private firms in the United States and
Europe account for roughly 41% of all Chinese exports 30 and 140/o-28% of
31
all Chinese carbon dioxide emissions.
Supply-chain contracting pressure also can alter the political and
economic incentives for the United States. New political incentives will
arise from the absence of China as a willing coparticipant in the current
embrace between emissions-reduction opponents in both countries. New
economic incentives will arise from the application of the supply-chain
contracting requirements not only to Chinese and other developing world
exporters, but also to manufacturers in the United States and other
developed countries, a feature that may be required in any event to avoid
simply shifting high-emitting production from country to country.
This Article begins with an assessment of current and projected
Chinese emissions. It then turns to an examination of the two principal
aspects of the China Problem: China's position on current and future
greenhouse gas emissions and the impact of the Chinese position on the
political process in the United States. Regardless of the actual incentives
faced by the two countries, both are functioning as if they lack incentives to

15, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 40.
30. See Gordon Fairclough, Wal-Mart Sneezes, China Catches Cold, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2007,
at B1 (noting that approximately 20% of Chinese exports go to the United States); Joe McDonald,
China Says Inflation, Trade Surplus Up, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article2007/09/1i/AR2007091100721,html (reporting that China's August 2007
exports to Europe ($23 billion) were 20.7% of China's total exports ($111.3 billion)).
31. See Bin Shui & Robert C. Harriss, The Role of C02 Embodiment in US-China Trade, 34
ENERGY POL'Y 4063, 4066 (2006) (estimating carbon dioxide emissions from Chinese exports to the
United States were 7/-14%). The estimates for carbon dioxide emissions from Chinese exports to
Europe were calculated assuming goods for export to Europe are comparable to goods for export to the
United States, and thus carbon dioxide emissions for these goods are comparable.
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make emissions reductions at the speed and magnitude necessary to reduce
the risk of catastrophic climate change.
The Article then examines potential remedies. It suggests that the
measures pursued to date, including excess allowances in international
agreements, other forms of public subsidies, and trade sanctions may be
necessary but face substantial hurdles. Subsidies in the form of allowances
will need to be very large to change China's incentives and granting
additional allowances of this magnitude may undermine efforts to achieve
desired emissions reductions. Other types of subsidies from the United
States and Europe are unlikely to be large enough to shift China's
incentives significantly. Many unilateral trade measures will generate
resistance from the World Trade Organization. Although these hurdles
ultimately may be overcome, if they slow down global emissions
reductions in the near term they will make it difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve the necessary reductions.
This Article offers a novel approach that can create new incentives for
prompt action by China and the United States. In short, the Article
demonstrates that resolving the types of information shortcomings
identified at the outset can stimulate private supply-chain contracting
pressure for carbon emissions reductions and bypass many of the hurdles
confronting other measures.3 2 A number of methods are available to induce
firms to adopt supply-chain contracting requirements, and this Article
suggests private or public carbon-labeling schemes for consumer goods and
corporate "carbon footprint" disclosure requirements. 33 These targeted
information-disclosure measures can be adopted by public or private
entities at little economic and political cost,34 and given the increasing
32. The supply chain includes "the production and distribution network that encompasses the
sourcing, manufacturing, transportation, commercialization, distribution, consumption, and disposal of
goods, from the ore mine to the trash can." PETER PARRY, JOSEPH MARTHA & GEORGINA GRENON,
Booz & Co., RESILIENCE REPORT: THE ENERGY-EFFICIENT SUPPLY CHAIN 1 (2007), available at
http://www.strategy-business.com/media/file/resilience-07-08-09.pdf.
33. While all definitions of "carbon footprint" involve quantifying the greenhouse gas emissions
of an individual or entity, a point of disagreement is "whether the carbon footprint needs to include
indirect emissions embodied in upstream production processes or whether itis sufficient to look at just
the direct, on-site emissions." THOMAS WIEDMANN & JAN MINX, ISA RESEARCH & CONSULTING, A
DEFINITION OF "CARBON FOOTPRINT" 2 (2007), available at http://www.isa-research.co.uk/docs/ISAUKReport_07-0l-carbon footprint.pdf.
34. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Private Politics and PrivatePolicy: A Theory of Boycotts 2-3, 33
(Stan. Graduate Sch. Bus. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1766, 2002), available at
https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1766.pdf (describing market pressure tactics of
nongovernmental organizations and noting that market pressure can be a more effective international
strategy than lobbying national government representatives). The incentives to disclose product and
firm carbon emissions could arise from public regulatory requirements or private nongovernmental
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consumer and corporate interest in climate change reductions, they could
create widespread pressure on firms in the United States and Europe to
require lower carbon-intensity from their suppliers. In fact, perhaps the
most important information deficiency regarding climate change is the
limited awareness by nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") that they
may have a greater impact on emissions from China and the United States
if they focus efforts on using information disclosure to create market
pressure that shifts the incentives of both nations rather than focusing
almost exclusively on lobbying35government policymakers who lack the
incentives to regulate emissions.
Supply-chain contracting requirements, thus, are a feasible, prompt
means of creating incentives for China and the United States to reduce
emissions. Supply-chain contracting pressure will not be a complete
substitute for subsidies in international agreements and other traditional
measures, but it may be necessary to stimulate the adoption and
implementation of these measures. Although supply-chain contracting
pressure alone will not bring China and the United States to the table, it
may be an essential step if we are to resolve the greatest current challenge
facing the international law regime.

organization schemes. Policymakers may face less resistance to information disclosure measures than to
measures that require emissions reductions directly. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social
Norms: How PersonalNorm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1101, 1136
(2005) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms]. Similarly, a wide range of experience
suggests that private labeling and carbon footprinting is feasible. See infra notes 189-230 and
accompanying text.
35.
Empirical studies suggest that information disclosure has had important but limited effects on
consumer and firm behavior over the last several decades. See, e.g., infra notes 203, 242 and
accompanying text. The consumer and corporate response to environmental information to date,
however, may not predict the future effects of information regarding climate change. The relative
importance of catastrophic climate change as compared to earlier environmental harms, the potential
efficiencies that may be gained from many carbon reduction efforts, and recent changes in corporate
behavior regarding carbon emissions all suggest reason for optimism. See id. It also is plausible that
market pressure resulting from information disclosure will influence Chinese politics regarding carbon
emissions, just as market pressure has influenced other aspects of the Chinese political system. See, e.g.,
Karen Halverson, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and PoliticalImplications, 27 B.C. INT'L
& COMp. L. REV. 319, 337-38 (2004) (explaining how China's commitment to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services will encourage reform of its banking system through market pressure); David
Barboza, China Moves to Refurbish a Damaged Global Image, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, at A6
(reporting the execution of the head of the Chinese State Food and Drug Administration and other
measures taken by China to guard against proposed trade sanctions following scandal regarding the
safety of Chinese exports).
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II. THE CHINA PROBLEM
A. CHINA'S EMISSIONS
Carbon dioxide is the most important of the greenhouse gases
identified in the Kyoto Protocol, accounting for roughly 85% of the
climate-forcing effect of all greenhouse gases. 36 For many years, the United
States has been the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, but China has been
gaining on the United States at a remarkable rate. For example, according
to the Energy Information Administration ("EIA") of the U.S. Department
of Energy, the United States accounted for 24.4% of the world's carbon
dioxide emissions in 2000, as compared to 21.9% in 2004. 37 Overall,
annual emissions from the United States did not decline during this
period-instead, they increased by roughly 100 million tons-but the
emissions
from China increased by more than 1.5 billion tons, or more than
8

50%.

In 2005, China released roughly 18% of the world's total of carbon
dioxide, the United States released 20.5%, and the combined total from
39
Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the rest of Europe was 23%.
Although experts predicted that emissions from China would not exceed
U.S. emissions until the end of the decade, 40 a recent report by the
Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency concluded that China
released 6220 million tons in 2006, passing the United States and its 5801
million tons as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases.41
Current Chinese emissions may be the largest in the world, but the
36. John Dembach & Widener Univ. Law Sch. Seminar on Energy Efficiency, Stabilizing and
Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,003, at 10,010 n.76 (2007) (noting that in 2004 carbon dioxide
accounted for 84.6% of the carbon dioxide equivalent contribution of all greenhouse gases). See also
James Hansen & Makiko Sato, Greenhouse Gas Growth Rates, 101 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SC. 16,109,
at 16,111 (2004) (noting that the other greenhouse gases are nitrous oxide (5% of climate-forcing
effect); methane (4%); the Montreal Protocol trace gases (for example, chlorofluorocarbons) and other
trace gases (I %)).
37. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2005, at 335
tbl. 11.19 (2006), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/O38405.pdf (demonstrating
that the United States' carbon dioxide emissions increased at a slower rate from 2000 to 2004 than the
rest of the world's emissions).
38. Id.
39. Paul Higgins, So What's the Problem with China?, CLIMATE POL'Y, Apr. 20, 2007,
http://www.climatepolicy.orgl?p=26#more-26.
40. Yardley & Revkin, supra note 1.
41. Gas Exchange, supra note 14. See also Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 (noting that the
International Energy Agency indicated in 2007 that China may pass the United States as the largest
emitter that year).
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projected future emissions are even more worrisome. The EIA predicts that
China's emissions will grow at a remarkable 4.2% per year during the 1990
to 2030 period, a growth rate that is higher than any other major emitter.4 2
The product of this growth rate will be an increase in carbon dioxide
emissions from 2241 million tons in 1990 to a projected 10,716 million
tons in 2030 (compared to a projected 1.3% annual growth rate from 19902030 for the United States and a 2030 total of 8115 million tons).43 China is
expected to release five times more carbon dioxide over the next twentyfive years than the Kyoto Protocol is projected to save. 44
China's emissions are increasing at a rapid rate in large part because
of new construction of coal-fired electric power plants. It added electric
power plants with a generating capacity of 102 gigawatts in 2006, an
amount equal to all of the electric power generating capacity in France,
after adding an amount equal to all of Britain the year before.45 On average,
a new coal-fired electric plant large enough to serve a city the size of
Dallas opens in China every seven to ten days. 46 Overall, China and other
to account for 85% of global energy
developing countries are projected
4
growth between 2003 and 2020. 1
The growing Chinese emissions have important implications for
global efforts to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. Although
differences emerge when turning to the optimal depth and speed of the
reductions, 48 the widely held view is that emissions reductions that
42.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 15, at 93 tbl.A 10. In fact, a recent study suggests that the
emissions growth from China may be increasing by 11% or more. See Maximilian Auffhammer &
Richard T. Carson, Forecastingthe Path of China's C02 Emissions Using Province Level Information,
55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 229, 29 tbl. 4 (2008).
43. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 15, at 93 tbl.A 10.
44. Patrick Symmes, The China Question: Leaping Tiger, Drowning River, OUTSIDE ONLINE,

Apr. 2007, htp://outside.away.com/outside/destinations/200704/yangtze-river-china-2.html.
45. Kahn & Yardley, supranote 14.
46. Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Pollutionfrom Chinese Coal Casts Shadow Around Globe,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11,2006, §1, at 1. See also Editorial, Taming Fossil Fuels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2007, at A 14 ("[T]he equivalent of one large coal-fired power plant is being built each week, using
antiquated methods.").
47. FLORIAN BRESSAND ET AL., McKNSEY GLOBAL INST., CURBING GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND
GROWTH: THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY OPPORTUNITY 24 (2007). The growth in coal-fired power plants

is not limited to China. See Andrew C. Revkin, Money for India's "Ultra Mega" Coal Plants
Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/money-for-indiasultra-mega-coal-plants-approved (noting that the International Finance Corporation will provide
financial backing for Indian plants that will emit twenty-three million tons per year of carbon dioxide).
48. Differences arise among economists. Compare WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CHALLENGE OF
GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC MODELS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (forthcoming) (manuscript at

19-21, available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice mss_072407_all.pdf) (advocating for a small
per-ton tax phased in gradually), with NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 40,
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substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change are advisable
on the global level. 49 An emerging consensus among scientists suggests
that reducing the risk of catastrophic climate change will require that global
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide not exceed roughly double
the levels that existed at the start of the industrial revolution (that is,
avoiding an increase from roughly 280 parts per million in 1750 to a range
of 450 to 550 parts per million).50 In response, many scientists and
policymakers have advocated leveling off greenhouse gas emissions in the
next decade and reductions in the 60%-80% range by 2050. 51 Targets
along these lines have been adopted or advocated by a number of foreign
governments and corporations, as well as states, local governments, and
corporations in the United States.52 To provide a sense of the magnitude of
286 (2007) (advocating for a larger per-ton tax and more prompt adoption).
49. Even leading economists who have differed on the speed and depth of reductions have
concluded that reductions of some sort are in the global interest. See NORDHAUS, supra note 48
(manuscript at 22); STERN, supra note 48, at 8; Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate Change: A
2007,
at
I,
I,
Challenge
to
Policy,
THE
ECONOMISTS'
VOICE,
June
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss3/art2 ("[B]oth futurity and uncertainty require significant
discounting. However, even with that.., we are much better off to act to reduce C02 emissions
substantially than to suffer and risk the consequences of failing to meet this challenge."). For a
discussion of global and national incentives in the legal literature, see generally Posner & Sunstein,
supra note 29 (noting that both the incentives and benefits for reducing greenhouse gas emissions vary
from country to country).
50.
STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: SCOPE OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 3 & n.1 (2007). See also
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 26, at 1682, 1686-87 (discussing scientific literature on target
atmospheric concentrations necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change). The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change concluded in May 2007 that stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide at levels that are thought to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change (445 to 535
parts per million) would result in a temperature change of less than 2 degrees Celsius or 3.6 degrees
Fahrenheit and would cause the economy to grow at a 0.12% lower annual rate, or a total of 3% by
2030. WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 12 tbl.SPM.4, 15 tbl.SPM.5, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf. See also id. at 18 tbl.SPM.6
(extending the analysis to 2050).
51. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 26, at 1686-87 (discussing the targets advocated by
policymakers and experts). For a debate on the necessity for immediate emissions reductions, compare
Sunstein, Complex Climate Change, supra note 9, at 2 (concluding that among economists the
"consensus is against" prompt aggressive reductions), with Brian C. O'Neill & Michael Oppenheimer,
Dangerous Climate Impacts and the Kyoto Protocol,296 SCIENCE 1971, 1972 (2002) (concluding that
delaying achievement of the Kyoto target from 2010 to 2020 may require a "staggering" 8% reduction
per year to begin before 2040 and that "such high rates of reduction may be prohibitively costly"), and
Friedman, The Power of Green, supra note 29 (quoting Stephen Pacala, one of the heads of the
Princeton Carbon Mitigation Initiative, for the proposition that to avoid doubling atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide "we have to get rid of 175 billion tons of carbon over the next 50
years... if we delay a decade or two, avoiding the doubling or more may well become impossible").
52. See, e.g., Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-127 (July 13, 2007), available at http://www.flgov.com/
pdfs/orders/07-127-emissions.pdf (setting a goal of 80% reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from
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the challenge presented by achieving 600/o-80% reductions by 2050, China
today has per capita emissions that are roughly one-sixth that of the United
States, but the 2050 target will53require global per capita emissions to be far
below current Chinese levels.
B.

CHINA'S INCENTIVES

China has enormous incentives to release large amounts of greenhouse
gases.54 China's booming economy is fueled by the export of manufactured
goods.55 Chinese manufacturing has a competitive advantage in large part
because of low energy costs. These low energy costs arise in part because
of huge coal reserves, which provide between two-thirds and three-quarters
of the energy used by China. 56 Coal emits far more greenhouse gases than
petroleum or other fossil fuels, and an even greater amount more than
renewable sources of energy. 57 China burned 2.7 billion tons of coal in
2006, more than the combined total of the United States, Japan, and
Europe. 58 In addition, with the construction of each new coal-fired electric
plant, China has a greater investment in coal as an energy source and a
reduced incentive to switch to other fuel sources. The growing prosperity
of China has generated increased domestic demand for cars and other

1990 levels by 2050); U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'SHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION 3-7, 12 (2007), available at
http://us-cap.org/USCAPCallForAction.pdf (expressing a statement by more than a dozen major
corporations and several environmental groups adopting goal of prompt near-term reductions and 60/80% reductions from 1990 levels by 2050); MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS,

U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT (2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/
climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (stating a number of goals geared toward reducing
"global warming pollution").
53. See Posting of Paul Baer to CLIMATE POLICY, http://www.climatepolicy.org/
?p=26#comment-226 (May 13, 2007, 01:43 EST) (stating in response to Higgins, supra note 39, that
"[tihe problem of course is that emissions everywhere need to average about 0.5 tC per capita or less by
2050, and China is already over this level (about 1.2 tC per capita currently by best estimates)").
54. See STEWART& WIENER, supra note 29, at 15.
55. David Barboza, China Says Its Economy Grew by 10.7% in 2006, with Little Inflation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at C3. See also Jianguo Liu & Jared Diamond, China's Environment in a
Globalizing World, 435 NATURE 1179, 1184 (2005) ("Export trade is a major cause of China's
increasing pollution ....Most of China's exports are primary goods or manufactured products that
create heavy pollution and require intensive resource uses.").
56. Compare Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 (stating that coal supplies two-thirds of China's
energy), with Corliss Karasov, On a Different Scale: Putting China's Environmental Crisis in
Perspective, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A452, A454 (2000) (stating that coal supplied three-quarters
of China's energy in 2000).
57.

See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LONG FORM FOR VOLUNTARY

REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES app. B at 47-48 (2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/
oiaf/ 1605/ cdrom/pdffFormElA- 1605_2005_Instructions.pdf.
58. Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14.
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consumer goods, 59 but most of the current Chinese emissions relate to
manufacturing for export. Furthermore, some benefits are expected to occur
from climate change, such as an increase in the growth rates of some
species of plants, which may increase agricultural production of some
60
crops.
China's incentives to continue emitting large amounts of carbon
dioxide also are affected by arguments grounded in fairness. These
arguments are likely to resonate among China's citizens and supporters
around the world: although it is the largest current emitter of greenhouse
gases, it is far from the largest in terms of per capita and aggregate
historical emissions. Chinese per capita emissions are roughly one-sixth of
those in the United States, as discussed above, and they are one-third of
those in the European Union. 61 In addition, historical emissions are relevant
because carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for fifty to two hundred
years.62 Since the start of the industrial revolution, China has emitted
roughly 7.8% of the global total. The comparable figures from 1750
through 2005 are 27.8% for the United States, 7.5% for Russia, and 31.1%
for the combined total of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the rest of
63
Europe.

From either the per capita or historical perspective, if the ability of the
atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases without triggering catastrophic
climate change is a common resource, China has yet to consume its equal
share. 64 Following this reasoning, China should be able to undercontrol to
achieve economic prosperity while countries that emit more per capita
today or emitted more historically should overcontrol. Regardless of the
merits of this argument, it is likely to affect the incentives faced by China

59. See, e.g., Friedman, The Power of Green, supra note 29 ("[l]f China keeps growing at 8
percent a year, by 2031 the per capita income of 1.45 billion Chinese will be the same as America's in
2004. China currently has only one car for every 100 people, but ...if it copies American consumption,
it will have three cars for every four people, or 1.1 billion vehicles. The total world fleet today is 800
million vehicles!").
60. The extent of the impacts on growth rates is likely to depend largely on the extent of the
carbon dioxide fertilization effect. See, e.g., LIN ERDA, ET AL., HM TREASURY, STERN REVIEW INTO
THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND ITS ECONOMICS IN CHINA 26-

28 (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8/l/stemreview-chinajimpacts.pdf.
61. See WORLD BANK, LITTLE GREEN DATA BOOK 2007, at 7 illus., 68, 225 (2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEEI/936214-1146251511077/21329572/LGDB2007.pdf.
62. EcoBridge, Frequently Asked Questions about Global Warming, http://www.ecobridge.org/
content/gjfaq.htm#remain (last visited July 20, 2008).
63. Higgins, supra note 39, at fig.2.
64. See NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N, P.R.C., CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAMME 58 (2007), available at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/Filel88.pdf.
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65
and other developing countries.

Although increases in per capita income have led to demands for
improvements in environmental protection in many countries (sometimes
referred to as the environmental Kuznets curve), this phenomenon does not
appear to occur for greenhouse gas emissions. 66 In fact, some studies
suggest that greenhouse gas emissions form a U-shaped or an N-shaped
curve, spiking up as per capita income increases above some threshold.67
Even if the Chinese population demands reduced greenhouse gas emissions
when per capita income reaches the levels typically associated with
demands for environmental protection in other industrializing countries, at
current growth rates the emissions that will occur by that time may well
exceed those that climate scientists suggest can occur without substantial
risk of catastrophic climate change. 68 In other words, simply waiting for the
Chinese to become sufficiently prosperous to demand environmental
amenities, even if the process does occur as it has for other environmental
pollutants, is not an option.
At the same time, China has a number of incentives to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions that are easily overlooked in gloom-and-doom
scenarios about the prospects for reducing the risk of catastrophic climate
change. Reports by scientists and policymakers suggest that China will
suffer substantial harm from climate change. If sea level rises occur to five
meters (roughly seventeen feet), 11.3% of coastal China will be
inundated. 69 The flooded area would include large parts of port cities such
65.
Sunstein,
emissions
66.

For an analysis of corrective and redistributive justice issues, see generally Posner &
supra note 29 (noting that both the incentives and benefits for reducing greenhouse gas
vary from country to country).
David I. Stem, The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 32 WORLD DEV.

1419, 1420, 1423-24 (2004); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Ethical Economist, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec.

2005, at 128, 129 (book review) ("Many forms of pollution have gone down as richer countries have
turned their mind to air-quality issues, but greenhouse gas emissions-with all the dangers they present
for global warming-have continued to increase with economic growth, especially in the United
States.").
67. See, e.g., Marzio Galeotti, Alessandro Lanza & Francesco Pauli, Reassessing the
EnvironmentalKuznets Curvefor C02 Emissions:A Robustness Exercise, 57 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 152,

162 (2006); Amy K. Richmond & Robert K. Kaufmann, Energy Prices and Turning Points: The
RelationshipBetween Income and Energy Use/CarbonEmissions, 27 ENERGY J. 157, 178 (2006).

68. This conclusion is based on the assumption that China will increase its emissions at rates
predicted by the U.S. Department of Energy. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 15, at 93 tbl.A10.
See also supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that China's emissions may be increasing at
more than 11% per year).
69. Du Bilan & Zhang Jinwen, Adaptation Strategy for Sea Level Rise in Vulnerable Areas
Along China's Coast, 19 ACTA OCEAONOLOGICA SINICA 1, 2 (2000) (P.R.C.). See also Gordon
McGranahan, Deborah Balk & Bridget Anderson, The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate
Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 17, 21-
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as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. 70 Although the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") articulated a range of roughly one to
two feet of sea level rise by 2100 in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, it
also concluded that it could not fully model the effects of the melting of the
Greenland ice cap. 7 1 Several leading climate scientists have suggested that
a nontrivial risk exists that the Greenland ice cap could begin to
disintegrate this century, 72 and if it does, the result will be sea level rises in
73
the five meter range.
In addition, James Hansen has noted that the last time global average
temperatures were roughly five degrees Fahrenheit higher than today, or
roughly equal to the IPCC's "best estimate" if carbon dioxide levels
double, sea levels were eighty feet higher. 74 An increase of this magnitude
would inundate a large percentage of the Chinese coast and would displace
roughly 250 million people. 75 Even in the absence of catastrophic climate
change, the dry north is expected to get drier and the wet south is expected
to get wetter, with adverse consequences in both cases for agriculture,
drinking water, and social strife.7 6 To the extent climate change effects
22 (2007) (noting that 2% of the world's land, inhabited by more than six hundred million people, lies
within ten meters of current sea levels).
70. See Bilan & Jinwen, supra note 69, at 3 fig. I.
71.
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 26, at 1683-84 (discussing IPCC report assumptions
and conclusions about Greenland and West Antarctica by James Hansen and others).
72.
Id. at 1683. See also WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 17 (2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. Research published after the
release of the 2007 IPCC report has raised concerns that sea level rises may exceed the high end of the
range identified by the IPCC. See Marc Kaufman, Escalating Ice Loss Found in Antarctica; Sheets
Melting in an Area Once Thought to Be Unaffected by Global Warming, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2008, at
AI ("The new finding comes days after the head of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
said the group's next report should look at the 'frightening' possibility that ice sheets in Greenland and
Antarctica could melt rapidly at the same time.").
73. See James E. Hansen, Can We Still Avoid Dangerous Human-Made Climate Change?, 73
SOC. RESEARCH 949, 957 (2006) [hereinafter Hansen, Can We Still Avoid?). See also O'Neill &
Oppenheimer, supra note 51, at 1971 (discussing the effect of disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice
Sheet). For an economic analysis of climate-change-related low probability, high consequence events,
see generally Martin L. Weitzman, Structural Uncertainty and the Value of Statistical Life in the
Economics of CatastrophicClimate Change (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working
Paper No. 07-11,
2007), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirectsafely.php?fname=../pdffiles/WP07-1 lItopostl 10607.pdf (noting the importance of accounting for low
probability/high consequence events in cost-benefit analyses of climate change). For a discussion of
catastrophic climate change in the legal literature, see Sunstein, Complex Climate Change,supra note 9,
at 22-24.
74. Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet,N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 12, 13 [hereinafter
Hansen, Threat]. See also infra note 99 and accompanying text.
75. Hansen, supra note 74, at 13.
76.
See NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N, supra note 64, at 17-19.
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occur in China, they also will occur in its trading partners, causing
economic harms that will reduce the demand for Chinese goods.
A second incentive for China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is
that cobenefits will arise from the reduction of other pollutants, particularly
if greenhouse gas emissions reductions are achieved through a shift away
from coal-fired energy production." The human health and environmental
harms arising from energy production in China are sufficiently great that
these cobenefits may amount to billions of dollars per year. In fact, recent
studies suggest that 400,000 to 750,000 Chinese die from air pollution
every year. 78 A "Green G.D.P." study conducted for the Chinese
government in 2004 concluded that environmental harms, even using low
values for human lives and excluding ecological effects altogether, would
have reduced the Chinese growth rate from 10% to 7%, and there are
suggestions that fully accounting for the human and ecological harms of
pollution in China might generate a negative growth rate. 79 The Chinese
government did not commission another Green G.D.P. study.8 °
China also faces domestic unrest because of environmental and human
81
health harms caused by pollutants other than greenhouse gases.
International pressure arising from domestic environmental conditions also
is influential. The recent furor over air quality for the 2008 Olympic Games
and the dramatic near-term response by the Chinese government
demonstrate that China has incentives to be perceived as a cooperative
82
global player.
77. For an overview of the cobenefits of Chinese greenhouse gas reduction efforts, see Kong
Chiu, Collin Green & Katherine Sibold, Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Co-Benefits of Integrated
Strategies in China, 6 SINOSPHERE 40, 41-42, 46 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ies/pdf/
general/sinospherearticle.pdf.
78. Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China's Environmental
Crisis, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 38, 47. See also Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 ("Ambient
air pollution alone is blamed for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year.").
79. Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 ("[T]he early results were so sobering ... that the project
was banished to China's ivory tower this spring and stripped of official influence."). See also HE KEBIN
& PAN XIAO CHUAN, ENERGY OPTIONS AND HEALTH BENEFITS FOR CHINA NATIONAL STUDY 18

(2003) (estimating overall economic cost to China from air pollution to be as high as 7.1% of GNP),
http://epa.gov/ies/pdf/china.natl assess/ies_china.pdf; Friedman, The Power of Green, supra note 29
(noting that according to one Chinese newspaper, in 2004 environmental harms cost China $64 billion,
or 3.05% of its GDP, although "[s]ome experts believe the real number is closer to 10 percent").
80. Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14.
81. See WORLD BANK, COST OF POLLUTION IN CHINA 33-57 (2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENTResources/China-Cost-of Poll
ution.pdf (discussing the health and economic impacts of water pollution); Kahn & Yardley, supra note
14 ("Officials blame fetid air and water for thousands of episodes of social unrest.").
82. See Liu & Diamond, supra note 55, at 1185 (noting that China's interest in joining the WTO
and hosting the Olympic Games has spurred pollution reduction measures); Kahn & Yardley, supra
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Given the near-term economic benefits and lengthy delay before the
more severe harms of climate change are likely to occur, whether it is in the
economic interest of China to reduce emissions turns largely on the
discount rate and the value assigned to low-probability, high-consequence
events such as the breakup of the Greenland ice sheet.8 3 If long-term harms
are discounted at any significant rate, the near-term incentives to rely on
coal-fired power for economic growth appear likely to dominate over the
long-term incentives to reduce emissions. 84 Even though catastrophic
climate change could flood large areas of the Chinese coast, disrupt
agriculture, and cause social dislocation, the Chinese are likely to perceive,
based on current studies, that there is uncertainty associated with the extent
and timing of the most severe climate change effects and that the most
important adverse effects are unlikely to occur until the 2030 to 2050
85
period or later.
In addition, although the cobenefits arising from reducing other
related forms of pollution may amount to avoiding the premature deaths of
several hundred thousand people per year and a reduction of several
percentage points in annual gross domestic product ("GDP"), the Chinese
economic and political sectors may be unwilling or unable to adopt and
enforce even those standards that would be cost beneficial in the near
term.86 The economic gains from the export of goods made with low-cost,
note 14 ("Beijing is frantically searching for a magic formula, a meteorological deus ex machina, to
clear its skies for the 2008 Olympics."). See also Thomas L. Friedman, Red China or Green?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A23 (noting increasing Chinese sensitivity to domestic environmental
problems arising from manufacturing goods for export).
83. Compare NORDHAUS, supra note 48, at 117-20, with STERN, supra note 48, at 76-78, 122.
See also Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stem Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45
J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 723-24 (2007) (concluding that it is important to "confront[] the issue of
what to do about catastrophe insurance against the possibility of thick-tailed rare disasters"); lnez Fung,
Remarks at the China-U.S. Climate Change Forum, What's at Risk? Climate Model Predictions and
Physical and Biological Impacts (May 23, 2006), available at http://webcast.berkeley.edu/
event-details.php?webcastid=15770 (examining impacts of climate change on China); Chen Yiyu et al.,
Assessment of Climate and Environment Changes in China (II): Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation of
Climate and Environment Changes, 2 ADVANCES CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 6, 8-10 (Supp. 1 2006)
(P.R.C.) (same).
84. For a recent discussion of climate-change-related temporal traps and social traps in the legal
literature, see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REV. 299 (2000) ("[The threat of global climate change creates such a social trap, a morass that,
because of its psychological characteristics, society is unlikely to resolve through conventional
approaches.").
85. See, e.g., ERDA ET AL., supra note 60, at 8-9 tbl.3 (noting that the agricultural sector will
have negative impacts by 2020, but predicting all regions to be in "balance" in terms of water supply
until 2050, and noting predicted impacts at time intervals of 2020, 2050, and 2080).
86. Economy, supra note 78, at 50-53 (discussing the difficulty of inducing local officials to
increase the priority given to climate change and other environmental concerns); Kahn & Yardley,
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coal-based energy sources will be tremendous. The cobenefits of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, particularly through reduced reliance on coalfired energy sources, are large, but for the next several decades are unlikely
87
to outweigh the economic benefits of heavy coal use for Chinese leaders.
In the last decade, China's actions have been consistent with this
analysis. It has continued to invest in low-cost, high-emitting coal-fired
electric generation and has not opted for high-efficiency turbines or carbon
sequestration. It has rejected national greenhouse gas reduction limits. 88 It
also has led the movement among developing countries to oppose the
inclusion of mandatory limits for developing countries in the Kyoto
Protocol 89 and in post-Kyoto negotiations.9"
C. THE AMERICA PROBLEM

China's large and growing greenhouse gas emissions and position on
mandatory targets also affects the political process in the United States.
The opposition of the U.S. government to mandatory targets in
international agreements and to limits on domestic emissions 9 1 is

supra note 14 ("For the Communist Party, the political calculus is daunting. Reining in economic
growth to alleviate pollution may seem logical, but the country's authoritarian system is addicted to fast
growth. Delivering prosperity placates the public, provides spoils for well-connected officials and
forestalls demands for political change. A major slowdown could incite social unrest, alienate business
interests and threaten the party's rule.").
87.
Cf Charles J. Vr6smarty et al., Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate
Change and Population Growth, 289 SCIENCE 284, 287 (2000) (concluding that water availability in
China will be dominated by population growth and economic development more than climate change
for the next several decades).
88.
Steven Mufson, In Battle for U.S. Carbon Caps, Eyes and Efforts Focus on China, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2007, at DI ("China's own climate-change plan issued Monday was seen as only a
modest step forward. Though the plan backed ambitious targets for fuel efficiency and the use of
renewable energy, it did not back greenhouse-gas targets."); Daniel Pruzin, China "Will Not Accept"
Emissions Limits; Government Adviser Cites Insufficient Data, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1515 (July 13,
2007) (reporting that "[a] senior adviser to the Chinese government said July 6 that China would not
accept binding greenhouse gas emissions limits under the Kyoto Protocol or subsequent climate change
agreements..."). See also NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N, supra note 64, at 58.
89.
Cf RANEE K.L. PANJABI, THE EARTH SUMMIT AT Rio: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 37-38 (1997) (noting that the Chinese suggestion that "[n]o country should encroach on
another under the pretext of environmental protection" was reflected in the Stockholm Declaration in
1972).
90. See Pruzin, supra note 88 (reporting comments by a senior adviser to the Chinese
government that China, as a developing country, should not set "quantitative emissions targets"); G-77
Developing Countries Issue ProposalCallingfor Emissions Targets Following 2012, Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA) (Dec. 6, 2005) (reporting that at the Eleventh Conference of the Parties in 2005, while China
and the other G-77 developing countries proposed emissions targets for themselves, they did not set any
specific targets, nor would the reductions begin until 2012).
91.
See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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problematic if the United States' interest is to reduce the risk of
catastrophic climate change. By failing to commit to emissions reductions,
the United States signals to other countries that they are dupes if they do so.
By failing to reduce its own emissions, the United States contributes to
rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Failing to commit
to and implement reductions thus increases the likelihood of catastrophic
climate change.
The interests of the United States are the subject of substantial debate
in the economic and legal literature. 92 The United States faces many of the
same incentives as China, including huge reserves of coal, which accounts
for 37% of domestic carbon dioxide emissions. 93 The United States also
will be better able to adapt to the effects of climate change than many
developing nations. 94 As a result, some have argued that substantial
reductions are not in the economic interest of the United States.95 Other
estimates, however, imply that more aggressive reductions are in the
economic interest of the United States. 96 Arguments grounded in
intragenerational concerns, particularly concerning the poor in India,
Africa, and other developing regions who may suffer the most in the near
term, also support an obligation on the part of the United States to bear
97
substantial costs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
A concern about harm to future generations also may motivate current
action, particularly because events such as major sea level increases may
98
cause harms that are irreparable and not subject to substantial adaptation.
92. See generally BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?, supra note 9; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29;
Sunstein, Complex Climate Change, supra note 9.
93. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-CONSTRAINED
WORLD 7 tbl.2.4 (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coafrhe Future_ofCoal.pdf
94. E.g., STERN, supra note 48, at 139.
95. See NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 10, at 91 tbl.4.10 (suggesting that a temperature
increase of 2.5 degrees Celsius will have less than a 0.5% impact on U.S. GDP). But see NORDHAUS,
supra note 48, at 137-38 (noting that participation by the United States in a global emissions reductions
agreement is justified). In 2007, the IPCC concluded that temperature increases above 2 degrees Celsius
(3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) raise the risk of substantial ecosystem change. WORKING GROUP II, supra note
72, at 14-15.
96. STEWART & WIENER, supra note 29, at 49-51. See also generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004) (examining potential harms of catastrophic climate
change). In addition, action by the United States may increase the pressure on China and others to
follow. See Sunstein, Complex Climate Change, supra note 9, at 34.
97. For example, India and Africa have contributed little to greenhouse gas emissions to date, yet
the harms to India and Africa may be severe and their ability to adapt limited. See Sunstein, Complex
Climate Change, supra note 9, at 4, 12 ("[T]he best alternative is to convince either or both [the United
States and China] that they have a moral obligation to act to protect those nations that are most
vulnerable.").
98. For a discussion of types of catastrophic climate change that have been identified in scientific
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For example, as discussed above, at least one leading climate scientist has
suggested that sea levels ultimately could increase by as much as twentyfive meters (eighty feet) if global average temperatures increase by five
degrees Fahrenheit.99 Whether temperatures will increase by five degrees
Fahrenheit and whether sea levels will increase twenty-five meters cannot
be known at this point. Furthermore, even if sea levels ultimately increase
to these levels, the increases will occur over a period of many decades and
centuries, not in the near future. 00 If sea levels do increase to this extent,
however, many of the major coastal cities in the United States, and nearly
all of Florida, will be inundated.' 1 Although adaptation efforts will be
effective against some of the harms arising from climate change, it is
unrealistic to assume that meaningful adaptation will be possible for
increases of this magnitude, whether by developed or developing countries,
and whether by gradual or abrupt increases.10 2 If elevated sea levels cause
harms that last for hundreds or thousands of generations, at some point the
0 3
intergenerational issue becomes compelling.1
literature as potentially irreparable and not subject to adaptation, see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra
note 26, at 1683-85 (noting the possibility of substantial sea level increases, ocean acidification, and
food chain disruption). For a recent discussion of intergenerational issues in legal literature, see
generally Symposium, IntergenerationalEquity and Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2007).
99. The "best estimate" of the IPCC is that if carbon dioxide levels double, which they are on
track to do before 2100, global average temperatures will be roughly five degrees Fahrenheit higher.
WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 12, 13 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf. James Hansen has noted that global average temperatures were five
degrees Fahrenheit higher three million years ago and that sea levels were roughly eighty feet (twentyfive meters) higher at that time. Hansen, Threat, supra note 74, at 13; Hansen, Can We Still Avoid?,
supra note 73, at 952, 957. See also James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb, SCi.
AM., Mar. 2004, at 68, 71 illus. (demonstrating the correlation between greenhouse gases, temperature,
and sea level over the past four hundred thousand years).
100. See Hansen, Threat, supra note 74, at 13. See also WORKING GROUP I, supra note 99, at 13
& tbl.SPM.3, 14 (discussing ice sheet collapse and sea levels).
101. Hansen, Threat, supra note 74, at 13.
102. 1 focus here on rising sea levels, but ocean acidification and several other climate-changerelated phenomena may present similar types of catastrophic, irreversible risks that are not subject to
adaptation on any meaningful level. See O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 51, at 1971-72;
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 26, at 1685 n.44 (discussing adaptation). For a discussion of
abrupt, catastrophic climate change, see POSNER, supra note 96, at 253-54.
103. For a recent examination of the viewpoints on intergenerational discounting, compare W. Kip
Viscusi, Rational Discountingfor Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (2007) (arguing that
intergenerational costs and benefits should be discounted based on the same methodology as are current
generation costs and benefits), with Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting... on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119
(2007) (arguing that "the use of discounting in the intergenerational context [does] not withstand
scrutiny"). If wealth increases, developed nations are able to adapt, and climate change harms are not
irreversible, then an argument can be made that the preferable approach is to transfer wealth directly to
the poor today rather than to do so indirectly through the form of emissions reductions. See Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 29, at 5 (observing that a payment to the poor now would be preferable to
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Despite these arguments in favor of emissions reductions, the United
States certainly is behaving as if it is not in its interest to adopt or
implement any emissions-reduction targets, and the existence of the large
and growing Chinese emissions alters both the actual interests of the United
States and the rhetoric used in the debate. In particular, it bolsters the
arguments of emissions-reduction opponents. 104 Opponents can point to
China as a reason not to adopt mandatory limits, while at the same time
refusing to push China to adopt these limits. 0 5 The use of China in the
logic and rhetoric about domestic climate-change regulation has occurred
in all three branches of the federal government.
The Bush Administration pointed to the failure of China to agree to
emissions targets in the Kyoto Protocol as a reason that the United States
formally indicated its intention not to join. 106 Two years later, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") pointed to emissions from
China and other developing countries as a reason not to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles in the United States, arguing
that unilateral action by the United States would undermine its ability to
use the promise of action to leverage Chinese emissions reductions. 10 7 At

emissions reductions, which would function as a payment to the poor in the future). Posner and
Sunstein nevertheless conclude that the United States should participate in an international agreement
even if its domestic economic costs exceed its benefits. Id. at 5-6.
104. See infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
106. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 2 ("The world's secondlargest emitter of greenhouse gases is China. Yet, China was entirely exempted from the requirements
of the Kyoto Protocol."); Jim Connaughton Hosts Ask the White House (Oct. 22, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ ask/print/20041022.html ("This Administration decided not to participate
in the Kyoto Treaty on climate change because its implementation would have meant the loss of nearly
$400 billion in U.S. GDP, and up to 4.9 million lost American jobs, many of which would be exported
overseas to developing countries with lower environmental standards, hurting our economic
competitiveness.... But that also means that the greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution also go
there, and in many instances go up-so we would not achieve anything to address the issue of reducing
emissions globally.").
107. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, at
52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003) ("Unilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle GHG emissions could also weaken
U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the GHG intensity of their economies.
Considering the large populations and growing economies of some developing countries, increases in
their GHG emissions could quickly overwhelm the effects of GHG reduction measures in developed
countries. Any potential benefit of EPA regulation could be lost to the extent other nations decided to
let their emissions significantly increase in view of U.S. emission reductions."). The EPA also has
declined to adopt more stringent mercury emissions standards for electric utilities in part because of the
risk posed by mercury from Pacific tuna that ultimately arises from Chinese coal burning. Cf Standards
of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 69
Fed. Reg. 4652, 4652, 4658, 4670 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (noting that the United States accounts for
only 3% of anthropogenic mercury emissions).
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the same time, the Administration has neither committed the United States
09
to mandatory reductions, 108 nor substantially pressured China to do so. 1
Instead, in 2002 the Administration set a national policy for the United
States of achieving an 18% reduction in the greenhouse gas intensity of the
economy between 2002 and 2012.110 This standard approximates the
greenhouse gas intensity reductions that occurred in the 1990s."' The
standard will allow aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to increase by 12%
during this period if economic growth increases at a 3% rate, a goal also
articulated by the Administration. 1 2 The Administration also initially
opposed other countries' attempts to use the G-8 and post-Kyoto
developments to begin the process of setting binding commitments for
greenhouse gas emissions. 113 Even though the United States led a recent
series of meetings that included China and other major emitters, in his
closing remarks the President expressly rejected adoption of binding
commitments for emissions reductions by the participants.1 14 Only in 2008
did the Administration announce a goal of leveling off United States
greenhouse gas emissions by 2025, and it conditioned inclusion of the goal
in an international agreement on participation by China and other major
emitters.115
Congressional opponents of mandatory emissions targets from both
108. See Editorial, Climate Week, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at A14 (noting that the Bush
Administration stated its opposition to binding targets in favor of "'aspirational' goals" when
announcing a summit on climate change.).
109. See Broder, supra note 21 (noting recent rejection by President Bush of mandatory targets for
all countries).
110. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Announces Clear Skies &
Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html.
111. Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program,32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 101 (2005).
112. Sarah Krakoff, Essay, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 BUFF. L. REV.
925, 931 (2005) ("[W]e could reach President[] [Bush's) goal of being GHG intensity-free, and
simultaneously continue indefinitely to increase our total GHG emissions.").
113. See, e.g., Tom Regan, Document: US Wants Climate Statement "Watered Down,"
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 20, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0620/dailyUpdate.html
(noting attempt to block G-8 statement advocating stringent measures). The administration has also
opposed emissions reductions by state governments in the United States. See, e.g., Justin Hyde, Bush
Called on to Halt Lobbying; Effort Against Fuel Rules Is Covert, Critic Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Sept. 25, 2007, at BI (noting an effort to persuade various states to lobby against an EPA waiver
necessary for California to implement tougher motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards).
114. Broder, supra note 21 (noting the rejection of country-specific "mandatory targets for
capping carbon dioxide emissions"). See also Dean Scott, Bush Announces September Climate Meeting
to Set Post-2012 Emissions Reduction Goal, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1712 (Aug. 10, 2007) (noting
opposition to mandatory targets expressed at time of meeting announcement).
115. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supranote 25.
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parties also have focused on the role of China. A number of Senators
pointed to China as a reason to oppose an agreement in advance of
Kyoto,'1 6 and a Senate resolution that passed with a 98-0 vote prior to
Kyoto advised the Clinton Administration not to commit to binding limits
if China and other developing countries failed to do so. 7 More recent
comments by congressional opponents of domestic emissions reductions
have continued to point to China.1 18 Justice Roberts also referenced China
in his dissent to the decision reversing and remanding the EPA
11 9
determination in Massachusetts v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.

The political debate in the United States reflects and informs public
opinion. Recent polling suggests that the public expresses high levels of
concern about climate change in the abstract, but also rejects remedial
measures that include taxes or higher energy prices by large margins, and it
ranks action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions below at least half a dozen
other concerns, including high gasoline prices. 120 In short, if we assume
that it is in the interest of the United States to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, the China Problem poses a substantial barrier to achieving that
goal. 121

116. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. S5623 (daily ed. June 12, 1997) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
117. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
118. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
120. See Kirk Johnson, We Agreed to Agree, and Forgotto Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008, § 4,
at 1 ("In a New York Times-CBS News poll last April, 43 percent of the respondents who thought the
weather had become stranger lately volunteered that global warming was the probable cause, up from
only 5 percent a decade ago. But asked in the same survey whether they'd support an increase in
gasoline taxes if that might help fight the climate problem, a resounding 58 percent said no.");
HART/NEWHOUSE, NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL SURVEY, STUDY #6083 (2008), available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/08061 INBC-WSJReleased.pdf. See also Karlyn
Bowman, How Hot Is Global Warming? A Review of the Polls, ENVTL. POL'Y OUTLOOK, July 2007, at
1, availableat http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.26519/pub_detail.asp.
121. The opposition to emissions reductions has occurred at the same time that the United States
has outsourced much of its most greenhouse-gas-intensive production. The United States increased
imports by 128% between 1997 and 2004, and the imports often included the types of goods that
require the most energy to produce. See Rhitu Chatterjee, Outsourcing U.S. Greenhouse-GasEmissions,
41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4834, 4834 (2007) (citing Christopher Weber of Carnegie Mellon University).
Although consumption increased in the United States during this period, emissions of greenhouse gases
did not increase proportionately. Id. Instead, it appears as though carbon-intensive production moved to
China and other developing countries, enabling the United States to outsource emissions, placating the
public by keeping down the price of consumer goods. See id. So long as the carbon footprint of the
United States accounts only for direct emissions and not for the emissions from the production of
imported goods, the outsourcing is not transparent.
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III. THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL INSTRUMENTS
The challenge facing policymakers is to develop incentives for China
and the United States to adopt and implement greenhouse gas emissions
reduction targets. Part III examines the traditional instruments that have
been the subject of much of the recent debate. A mix of these instruments
may be necessary to induce movement by the two countries, but a variety
of intrinsic barriers have rendered them insufficient to date.
The options widely discussed in the legal literature include a group of
instruments that require that the parties have independent incentives to
comply or that assume the existence of some coercive authority. Examples
include emissions limitations, taxes, and cap-and-trade schemes, all of
which require some form of international agreement and governmental
involvement in law formation, monitoring, and enforcement. A second
group of "beneficiary pays" instruments avoids the problem of the absence
of a coercive authority by assuming that change will occur through

subsidies. 122
A.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The lack of a global government makes a direct coercion approach
difficult if not impossible. It is conceivable that the post-Kyoto process will
yield an agreement that will be adopted by the vast majority of major
emitters, including the United States and China. The agreement could
include a range of command-and-control provisions (for example, a
requirement that coal-fired utilities use combined-cycle turbines and be
fitted with carbon-sequestration technology), a global carbon tax, a global
cap-and-trade scheme, or other remedies that require some form of
government adoption and enforcement.
Adoption and enforcement of emissions-reduction commitments
through a multilateral agreement, however, confronts a collective-action
problem.123 China, the United States, and other countries have incentives to
act in ways that are individually rational but collectively deficient for the
world as a whole.124 The incentives for China and the United States to
122. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 752-53 (1999) (examining "polluter pays" and "beneficiary pays"
options). See also STEWART & WIENER, supra note 29, at 74-75.
123.
BARRETr, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT, supra note 29, at 16-17. See also generally
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols,31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007)
(concluding that a principal reason for the success of the Montreal Protocol and "mixed picture" of the
Kyoto Protocol was determined by the United States' decision to join the former and reject the latter).
124. Scholars differ on whether the China-U.S. relationship is a prisoner's dilemma. Compare
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agree to and implement a costly set of emissions-reduction requirements in
the near term are uncertain at best.125 In the absence of adequate incentives
by China and the United States, the prospects for an adequate new
multilateral agreement are dim. The post-Kyoto process does not appear to
be developing fast enough among a sufficient number of major emitters to
avoid a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide from
preindustrial levels.
B. SUBSIDIES

If instruments that rely on public coercive methods are not successful
in achieving emissions reductions of the magnitude and in the time
necessary to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change, policymakers
could turn to a beneficiary pays model. 126 The Clean Development
Mechanism ("CDM") provisions of the Kyoto Protocol already serve this
function. 127 The CDM process allows developed country signatories to
achieve their Kyoto emissions targets by subsidizing activities in the
developing world. The subsidies occur through a complex process of
review and approval of offsets, yet critics in recent years have identified a
number of situations in which the emissions avoided were dubious or
nonexistent. 128 Although these criticisms need not be fatal to the CDM
effort, they do demonstrate that these types of subsidies require substantial
oversight to avoid abuse. In any event, these subsidies to date have not
been sufficient to induce China or other developing nations to agree to and
implement greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
Many proponents of a post-Kyoto agreement have argued that China
and other developing nations should be provided with a subsidy in the form
of additional emissions allowances.' 29 For example, the allowance
Sunstein, Complex Climate Change, supra note 9, at 5, 18 (noting that a prisoner's dilemma does not
exist because the United States and China will not benefit significantly from cooperation), with Stephen
M. Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 387, 406-16 (2001) (noting that
the problem can be viewed as a prisoner's dilemma or a battle of the sexes). The remedy proposed in
this Article functions without regard to whether a prisoner's dilemma exists.
125.
See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 29, at 10 (noting that the United States' costs of
emissions control may be high and may have been as much as 80% of the costs for all industrialized
nations to comply with the Kyoto Protocol); Gardiner, supra note 124, at 388 & n.3 (referencing
incentives relating to global climate change).

126. See, e.g., STEWART & WIENER, supra note 29, at 102-04 (discussing side payments).
127. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 12,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (creating the CDM program).
128.

See, e.g., Michael Wara, Commentary, Is the Global CarbonMarket Working?, 445 NATURE

595,595-96 (2007).
129. E.g., CTR. FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION IN BRAZIL, CHINA AND
INDIA: SCENARIOS AND OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH 2025 iv (2006) (suggesting a scenario in which
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allocation could enable China to increase emissions in the near term and
reduce emissions more gradually than developed countries. Although a
subsidy in the form of additional emissions allowances may be a necessary
inducement, the number of allowances will need to be very large to
overcome China's near-term economic incentives. If the number of the
allowances is large, however, they will enable correspondingly large
increases in global carbon dioxide emissions unless offset by reductions in
allowance allocations to other countries. It is not clear that sufficient
allowances can be provided to shift China's incentives without
undermining support for the cap-and-trade scheme in the subsidizing
countries or allowing emissions to exceed the target levels necessary to
reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. 30 The subsidy-throughallowances approach also could be extended to the United States, but this
approach is subject to the same problems.
In addition to emissions allocations in multilateral international
agreements, national or subnational governments that have incentives to
bear substantial costs could enter into bilateral agreements that provide for
side payments to China and the United States to create incentives for
emissions reductions.' 31 Normative objections to paying the United States,
given its prosperity, are likely to make this option unfeasible for the
foreseeable future. 132 Payments to China may face somewhat less
normative resistance given the per capita and historical arguments
discussed above, but the history of small foreign aid payments33by many
developed nations casts doubt on the prospects for this approach. 1
One of the most frequently discussed forms of side payments involves
technology transfer and subsidization. The countries that stand to benefit
the most from an international agreement could provide China with the
access and the funds to acquire more efficient turbines or new carbon
sequestration technologies as they are developed. This is the "China price"

China is allowed to increase total emissions through 2020 while the United States levels off emissions
and the European Union reduces emissions to 30% below 1990 levels).
130. See id. (noting the need to keep total emissions below levels that will generate 450 ppm
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide).
131. Cf BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT, supra note 29 at 346-49 (noting that
assistance from the Global Environment Facility was essential to getting developing nations to comply
with the Montreal Protocol).
132. For a discussion of the various types of side payments as well as corrective and distributive
justice issues associated with side payments, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 3-6 & n.14;
Sunstein, Complex Climate Change, supra note 9, at 29-30.
133. Sunstein, Complex Climate Change, supra note 9, at 20, 27-30 (noting different forms of
side payments and some history of small foreign aid payments).
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strategy that Thomas Friedman has advocated. 134 In Friedman's view,
policies should be directed at developing and transferring low-cost
alternative energy sources to China that can provide energy to Chinese
35
manufacturers at or below the cost of coal-fired electric utilities. 1
Although a strategy based on technology transfer and subsidies may
be an important part of the total mix of incentives, technology transfer on
the scale necessary may not be viable because it will not address the U.S.
domestic-political aspect of the China Problem: it will not mollify critics
who ground their objections in concerns about enhancing the economic
strength of China. 136 To make a substantial dent in China's emissions, the
wealth transfers between China and the developed nations would have to be
massive. Opponents of emissions reductions in the United States who point
to China's economic growth as a reason the United States should not
expend significant amounts to control its domestic emissions are likely to
object to a nation-to-nation subsidy of any substantial magnitude.
Technology transfer efforts that create goodwill and demonstrate some
responsiveness on climate change may garner support among skeptics, but
efforts of the magnitude necessary to provide meaningful levels of energy
at less than the China price also would increase the economic
competitiveness of China.' 37 These incentives may explain why technology
transfer programs to date have been widely publicized but funded at low
levels. 138 In addition, it is not clear that alternative technologies exist that
would generate large amounts of energy in China at costs that taxpayers in
the United States would be willing to pay and in the time horizons
39
necessary. 1
134. Friedman, The Power of Green, supra note 29 (describing the "China price" as "basically the
price China pays for coal-fired electricity today").
135. Id. The Bush Administration's Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
can be seen as an effort to subsidize the development of alternative energy sources in China, India, and
other Asian countries. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: The AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (Jan. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/print/20060111-8.html.
136. Jim Connaughton hosts Ask the White House, supra note 106 (Chairman of White House
Council on Environmental Quality discussing concern about loss ofjobs to developing countries).
137. See id.
138. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 135 (noting in 2006
that the Administration would propose $52 million in funding to support the Asia-Pacific Partnership).
139. The framing of these costs may be very important. Consumers may be more willing to pay
higher prices for goods via supply-chain contracting or the increased prices that will arise from cap-andtrade schemes than they will be willing to pay for higher taxes. See Johnson, supra note 120
(demonstrating Americans' distaste for taxes even when levied to remediate climate change, an issue
about which they express a high level of concern); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect:
The Role of Private Contractingin Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 966 (2007) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart Effect] (exploring the possibility that consumers may be willing to pay for
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Technology subsidies at these levels thus are likely to carry the same
rhetorical weight as unilateral emissions reductions and with the same
effect: domestic opposition in the United States.' 40 Similarly, if the
technology-subsidy efforts are viewed by the public in the United States as
a form of foreign aid, history suggests that funding will be limited. 141 In the
absence of meaningful participation by the United States, it is difficult to
comprehend how other developed nations could provide technology or
other subsidies to China at levels sufficient to shift its incentives. And, in
the absence of a shift in China's position, the United States may continue to
oppose emissions limits.
C.

TRADE SANCTIONS

A number of countries have considered unilateral trade measures to
induce other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 142 These
potential trade measures have included a fee designed to account for the
global warming effects of air travel and tariffs on imports from nations that
did not adopt Kyoto. 143 In addition, the leading cap-and-trade legislation in
the U.S Senate includes a provision that would require the purchase of
allowances for imported goods from countries not meeting certain
emissions-reductions standards. 144 Many forms of trade sanctions will face
World Trade Organization ("WTO") hurdles, however. 145 Even measures
that do not comprise explicit trade sanctions may be subject to successful
challenges in the WTO dispute settlement body if, for example, the

environmental control costs).
See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
140.
141.
See Posner & Sunstein supranote 29, at 19 & n.99 (discussing foreign aid contributions).
142.
Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. FederalClimate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and
Options ofInternational Trade Law 5-8 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol. Solutions, Duke U., Working
Paper No. 07-02, 2007).
See id. at 8 & nn.17-18; Rick Mitchell, Dutch Airline Organization, Airport Group Sue
143.
Government Over Environmental Tax, Int'l Envt. Daily (BNA), at I (Feb. 25, 2008).
America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 6006 (as referred to the S.
144.
Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, Oct. 18, 2007).
Steve Chamovitz, The WTO's Environmental Progress, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 685, 689
145.
(2007); Steve Chamovitz, Environmentalism ConfrontsGATT Rules, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 37,40 (1993)
[hereinafter Charnovitz, Environmentalism]. See also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER &
DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 846-59 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing
past U.S. trade restrictions that have been attacked under WTO rules). The National Foreign Trade
Council has noted that a provision of S. 2191 that addresses allowance requirements for U.S. imports
may violate national treatment under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article IllI.
NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, WTO-COMPATIBILITY OF FOUR CATEGORIES OF U.S. CLIMATE
POLICY 2-3, 21-24
CHANGE
Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf.

(2007),

available

at

http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/wto/
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measures are determined to be technical barriers to trade ("TBT"). 146 In
theory, the nations that formed the WTO could adopt reforms that allow or
even encourage aggressive climate change actions by member nations, but
international collective action regarding the WTO presents many of the
same incentive problems as do other forms of multilateral international
action. Although trade measures of some type ultimately may be a part of
the global response to climate change, the prospects are limited for putting
effective trade sanctions in place in the near future.
IV. SUPPLY-CHAIN CONTRACTING
Rather than relying only on traditional instruments with limited
prospects for success or abandoning the goal of reducing China's
emissions, the better approach is to add new instruments to the mix that
may tip the balance of incentives and induce China, and ultimately the
United States, to make meaningful reductions. The emerging private
global-governance literature suggests a particularly promising alternative
instrument: private supply-chain contracting.147 A focused strategy directed
at inducing importers of goods in developed countries to impose carbon
reduction requirements on suppliers may provide additional incentives for
prompt, substantial reductions by China, the United States, and other
countries.
Supply-chain contracting pressure may create negative incentives for
Chinese firms through increased pressure by buyers to shift production to
148
less carbon-intensive manufacturers, in some cases in other countries.
This is the obverse of the China price: rather than lowering the cost of lowcarbon alternative energy sources, the contracting pressure may reduce the
demand for high-carbon Chinese goods.1 49 A risk exists that if firms in
developed countries exert too much pressure without also offering to pay
higher prices, the Chinese government will retaliate in other ways,
146.

E.g., NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, supranote 145, at 2 ("Government-administered eco-

labeling schemes in H.R. 6 may violate Article 11 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade for constituting measures that are 'more trade-restrictive than necessary' to protect the
environment, even if this objective is 'legitimate."'). See also Chamovitz, Environmentalism, supra
note 145, at 40. The WTO Appellate Body and subsequent compliance panel discussions examine the
ability of states to protect the environment under the GATT. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the

DSU by Malaysia, 1 54, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Panel Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products,

147.
148.

152-53, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998).

See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
See Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 139, at 918 n.14 (discussing the low-

price strategy that has generated controversy regarding Wal-Mart and other large firms).
149. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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undermining the supply-chain contracting effort. For example, a Chinese
official recently described importers' demands that China improve its
environmental conditions while selling inexpensive goods as "eco' 150
colonialism."
Positive incentives also may arise for Chinese firms, however.
Consumers in developed countries may be willing to pay a price premium
and buyers may identify efficiencies that they share with suppliers. In this
way, supply-chain contracting could function as a private subsidy that is
more efficient, raises fewer symbolic issues, and is more151politically viable
than payments from one national government to another.
Section IV.A identifies the elements of supply-chain contracting
requirements that will be necessary if the approach is to have the desired
effect, and Section IV.13 examines how supply-chain contracting
requirements may influence national positions on emissions reductions.
Section IV.C then demonstrates the extent to which supply-chain
contracting requirements for greenhouse gases already are in place around
the globe.
A. ELEMENTS

In recent years, scholars have recognized that domestic and global
1 52
governance involves a complex mix of public and private institutions.
The supply-chain contracting approach contemplated here involves firms in
the United States and other developed countries insisting on greenhouse
gas emissions restrictions in supply-chain contracting with sellers of goods
in China and other developing countries.1 53 In addition, to avoid simply

150.
Economy, supra note 78, at 55.
151.
See infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
152.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN CASHORE, GRAEME AULD & DEANNA NEWSOM, GOVERNING THROUGH
MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 5 (2004); Daniel
C. Esty, Good Governance at the SupranationalScale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J.
1490 (2006) (advocating the use of administrative law principles and tools to increase support for global
governance institutions); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (noting domestic public-private collaborative activities); Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (examining public-private hybrids
and standard-setting); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 23 (2005) ("cautiously" suggesting that
conceptions of the global regulatory regime should be extended to include private standard setting
organizations that carry out regulatory functions).
153.
For an empirical study of recent environmental supply-chain activity and its implications for
global governance, see Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 139, at 921-70. See also
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2074 (2005)
(examining the governmental functions performed by private-private contracting).
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shifting high-carbon production to developed countries, buyers will need to
apply the supply-chain contracting requirements to sellers in the United
States and other developed countries as well. Applying the supply-chain
contracting requirements to all domestic and foreign suppliers also may
reduce the risk of an adverse ruling from the WTO in the event the WTO
concludes that it has jurisdiction.
The greenhouse gas restrictions could occur in any of several forms,
such as limits on the carbon intensity of the contracted-for good (for
example, total emissions in carbon-equivalents per unit of production) or
on the total greenhouse gas emissions arising from the contractual
relationship between the manufacturer and importer over a specified time
period.154 Emissions restrictions could be imposed through vendor or
product eligibility requirements or through express terms in supply
contracts.
Standard setting could be facilitated by use of private or public-private
standard-setting organizations along the lines of the International
Standardization Organization, the Forest Stewardship Council, or the
Marine Stewardship Council.' 5 5 An extensive literature has documented the
growth of private standard-setting organizations and examined their
efficacy and accountability. 15 6 Although private standard-setting
organizations face shortcomings on both fronts, in some global commons
settings and in countries with little effective government these
organizations may be essentially the only entities performing governmental
functions.
Monitoring and enforcement of greenhouse gas provisions in supplychain contracts will be difficult. At the same time, adoption of the supply-

154. In theory, the contract requirements could be based on a national greenhouse gas emissions
total or per capita average, but the absence of control over those totals would make manufacturers
reluctant to commit to them.
155. See generally Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Collective Action Through Voluntary
Environmental Programs:A Club Theory Perspective, 35 POL'Y STUD. J. 773 (2007) (exploring the
effectiveness of voluntary environmental programs among private organizations); Aseem Prakash &
Matthew Potoski, Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001, 50 AM. J.
POL. ScI. 350 (2006) (discussing ISO 14001, a commonly employed environmental regulation that
suggests private organizations should aspire to exceed the environmental regulations their counties
require); Erika N. Sasser et al., Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private
Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector, BUS. & POL., Dec. 2006, at 1 (2006),
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 163&context=-bap
(discussing the
Forest
Stewardship Council).
156. See generally, e.g., Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public
Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47 (2006) (examining collective private forestry
standards).
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chain contracting approach by a number of major buyers may create large
market incentives even if not all buyers impose requirements and not all
sellers comply with the requirements that are imposed. In some globalcommons settings and countries, private monitoring and enforcement may
be as good as or better than the public enforcement that would occur with
public regulatory requirements, if any exist. To the extent government
regulatory compliance is the benchmark, substantial compliance with
environmental regulatory requirements often hovers in the 75% range in
developed countries, and developing countries often experience lower rates
57
of compliance with such requirements. 1
In addition, recent experience with labor and other environmental
terms in supply-chain contracts has shown that monitoring and enforcement
does occur. 15 8 Examples from a variety of developing countries
demonstrate the variety of different ways in which monitoring and
enforcement of low-carbon provisions in supply-chain contracts could
occur. For instance, firms that have imposed labor and environmental
supply-chain contract requirements have retained hundreds of employees to
inspect suppliers in some cases, and others have relied on an emerging
number of consulting firms that provide assurance services. 159 Firms also
have been subject to independent monitoring by standard-setting
organizations and by NGO advocacy groups.' 60 Perhaps most importantly,
studies suggest that private standards with private enforcement have had
substantial effects on suppliers' behavior in China and other developing
countries. 161
B. EFFECTS

Widespread adoption of supply-chain contracting requirements by
157. See, e.g., Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory
Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & ECON. 331, 343 (1990) (noting
compliance rates with major clean water requirements in the United States); Petra Christmann & Glen
Taylor, Globalization and the Environment: Determinants of Firm Self-Regulation in China, 32 J. INT'L
BUS. STUD. 439, 441 (2001) (noting monitoring and enforcement issues in developing countries).
158. See Christmann & Taylor, supra note 157, at 452 (concluding that firm adoption of
environmental management standards in China correlates with exports).
159. See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, Assurance Services as a
Substitutefor Law in Global Commerce 4, 23 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 07-06, 2007) (documenting growth of private assurance providers).
160. See id. at 22-23.
161. See, e.g., Christmann & Taylor, supra note 157, at 449-52 (examining adoption of
environmental management systems and environmental performance of firms in China). See also
generally Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Investing Up: FD1 and the Cross-CountryDiffusion of
ISO 14001 Management Systems, 51 INT'L STUD. Q. 723 (2007) (examining the relationship of foreign
direct investment and firm adoption of environmental management standards).
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firms in the United States, Europe, and other developed countries could
have substantial effects on the incentives faced by China, and ultimately
the United States. The United States imports goods accounting for a
significant portion of China's GDP, 162 and Europe imports goods
accounting for another substantial amount. 163 As stated at the outset, the
manufacture of goods for export to the United States and Europe also
accounts for roughly 140/o-28% of all Chinese carbon dioxide emissions. 1
Single companies such as Wal-Mart, with its imports from China of
65
roughly $18 billion per year, also are remarkably influential.1
Supply-chain contracting requirements may influence China's
incentives in several ways. First, they may accelerate the extent to which
government and private managers identify efficiencies. The potential for
efficiency gains in China are tremendous,' 66 as much of the recent Chinese
economic growth has occurred through the development of inefficient
industries that use prodigious quantities of energy and balance remarkable
inefficiency with low energy and labor costs. 167 These industries include
the aluminum smelting industry, which is a major user of electricity and
uses more energy than the entire Chinese commercial sector, as well as the
steel industry (using 20% more energy per ton of steel produced than the
168
international average) and the cement industry (using 45% more).
Inefficiencies also arise from the profusion of township and village
enterprises ("TVEs"). These TVEs average only six employees per
enterprise, but they produce half of China's exports, and their small size
and other characteristics lead them to contribute disproportionately to
emissions.' 69 In many cases, the inefficiencies in manufacturing are the
product of massive government subsidies 70 that may look less advisable if
exporting industries are subject to supply-chain contracting pressure.
Although the Chinese economy is becoming more energy efficient, China
has not met recent targets for energy intensity (energy use per unit of

162.
States).

McDonald, supra note 30 (noting that China exported $20.9 billion in goods to the United

163.
164.
165.

Id. (reporting that China's August 2007 exports to Europe were 20.7% of its total exports).
See supra note 3 1.
Fairclough, supra note 30. See also Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 139, at

927.
166.
Economy, supra note 78, at 57 (stating that "vast gains" in environmental protection efforts
can be achieved by bringing the efficiency of Chinese industry up to world standards).

167.
168.

See id. at 40.
Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 (citing a World Bank report).

169.

Liu & Diamond, supra note 55, at 1180-81.

170. Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 (noting adoption of tax incentives and government subsidies
in a Chinese 1997 economic program).
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171
GDP), and inefficiencies stretch across many industrial sectors.

Second, supply-chain pressures will increase Chinese manufacturers'
incentives to opt for less carbon-intensive energy sources where they are
available. Where alternatives are not available, the manufacturers will have
greater incentives to pressure local and national government officials to
invest in less carbon-intensive energy sources. The pressure may lead
China to generate less electricity from coal and more from other sources, to
generate energy from coal more efficiently, 7 2 or, if the technology is
available, to sequester carbon dioxide generated from burning coal.1 73 The
means by which these pressures will be transmitted through the economic
and political systems in China are beyond the scope of this Article, but the
response of China to economic pressure in other realms suggests a
reasonable likelihood that supply-chain contracting will have substantial
effects on governmental decisionmaking at many levels.' 74 The claim is not
that China will promptly adopt and implement stringent emissions targets
or be able to shift promptly to alternative sources of energy, but that China
will have additional incentives to do so, and that the additional incentives,
on top of others mentioned above, will induce China to act.
C. PREVALENCE

Firm environmental behavior in the last several years confirms that
incentives already exist for some firms to impose greenhouse gas
requirements on supply-chain contractors and that doing so can generate
impressive reductions. For example, some initial activities are already
underway in China to increase efficiency through supply-chain
networks. 175 Wal-Mart has responded to a range of incentives by taking the
first steps toward imposing supply-chain requirements in China, beginning
with a scorecard system to assess suppliers.176 Specific energy efficiency or

171. See Economy, supra note 78, at 40 (noting that goods production in China uses seven times
as much energy as Japan and three times as much energy as India).
172. See Kahn & Yardley, supra note 14 (noting that the Chinese typically have opted not to build
plants with combined-cycle turbines, which are more efficient but also more costly to build than
traditional power plants).
173.

See HOWARD HERZOG & JAMES KATZER, THE FUTURE OF COAL IN A GREENHOUSE GAS

CONSTRAINED WORLD 3-5 & tbl.5 (2004), http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/GHGT8-Herzog-Katzer.pdf
(concluding that with current technology, greenhouse gas sequestration from coal-fired utilities in the
United States would increase the cost by approximately 40% and reduce electricity output by 20%).
174.
Market pressure has influenced other aspects of the Chinese political system. See, e.g.,
Halverson, supra note 35, at 323-33; Barboza, supra note 35.
175.
See, e.g., Economy, supra note 78, at 58 (citing pilot program providing financing for

factories' efficiency upgrades).
176. See Press Release, Wal-Mart, WaI-Mart Buyers Put Packaging Scorecard into Practice (Jan.
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greenhouse gas requirements are not a part of the program at this point, but
Wal-Mart is taking emissions into account by scoring potential Chinese
suppliers "greenhouse gas emissions" and "emissions related to the
distance packaging materials are transported."' 7 7 With ten thousand
Chinese suppliers and $18 billion in annual imports from China, Wal-Mart
alone may have a substantial influence. 178 General Motors and the World
Environment Center also have conducted a joint pilot project to improve
the environmental performance and to reduce carbon emissions from eight
79
of General Motors' suppliers in China. 1
Other companies in the United States have imposed greenhouse gas
emissions requirements on their domestic and foreign suppliers, including
Timberland, 180 Pepsi, 18 1 and possibly Ford.'82 Additionally, the growing
interest in firms' supply-chain emissions has spawned an expanding market
for consultants offering advice and products relating to carbon footprint
analysis and supply-chain emissions reductions."8 3 The potential gains from
supply chains sometimes arise from surprising places. For example,
Timberland calculated its carbon footprint and found that a large share of
its emissions were arising not from the production, shipment, and retailing

31, 2008), availableat http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoon/7911 .aspx.
177. Wal-Mart plans to initiate its scorecard program next year. Id.
178. See Fairclough, supra note 30 (stating in the title that when "Wal-Mart Sneezes, China
Catches Cold"); Sarah Schafer, A Welcome to Wal-Mart, NEWSWEEK (Pacific ed.), Dec. 20, 2004, at 30,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/56097 ("Chinese suppliers say Wal-Mart is already having a
transformative effect on everything from supply chains, to distribution networks, to customer service.
The company has a network of 10,000 suppliers for its China operation, most of which are small and
not part of its global supply chain. Thus, the spread of Wal-Mart stores is raising efficiency standards
for a growing number of Chinese suppliers ...").
179. GM, WEC Report on Green Supply Chain Project, ENVTL. LEADER, Aug. 3, 2007,
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2007/08/03/gm-wec-report-on-green-supply-chainproject
(describing energy savings as "significant" from actions such as changes to lighting in Chinese
factories); Press Release, World Env't Ctr., General Motors and World Environment Center Report
Significant Results in China "Green Supply Chain Project," July 31, 2007, available at
http://www.wec.org/news/general-motors-and-world-environment-center-report-significant-results-inchina-201 cgreen-supply-chain-project20l d.
180. Amy Cortese, Friends of Nature? Let's See Those Shoes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at H5.
181. See
2007
ENERGY
STAR
Award
Recipients,
http://www.energystar.gov/
index.cfm?c=industry.bus-award-recipients.2007 (last visited July 27, 2008) ("PepsiCo worked
'upstream' to reduce the embedded energy of inputs to its business by requesting that suppliers establish
energy goals, demonstrate energy management activities, and join the ENERGY STAR partnership.").
182. See id. (noting that as to Ford, "[k]ey strategies for moving energy management ahead
included... working with suppliers to address the embedded energy burden upstream of the company").
It is unclear whether "working with" included imposing efficiency requirements on suppliers.
183. E.g., IBM Helps Clients Calculate and Cut Carbon Footprints, ENVTL. LEADER, Aug. 24,
2007,
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2007/08/24/ibm-helps-clients-calculate-cut-carbonfootprints,
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of its shoes, but from the methane emitted by the cows that supply the shoe
leather.' 8 4 Timberland is exploring whether a change in the use of raw
materials will reduce the methane emissions.'8 5 Numerous other U.S. firms
have imposed environmental requirements other than greenhouse gas
restrictions on their suppliers, and many additional firms in the United
States and abroad impose labor and other nonenvironmental social welfare
86
standards on suppliers.1
Firms in other countries also have imposed greenhouse gas or energyuse requirements on their suppliers. For example, Ericsson has required its
suppliers
to
minimize
energy use
in electronic-component
18
7
manufacturing. Tesco and Marks & Spencer in the United Kingdom also
have imposed efficiency or greenhouse gas emissions reduction
88
requirements on their suppliers. 1
The question, then, is what might induce additional firms in the United
States, Europe, and other developed countries that import goods from
China to impose greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements on their
suppliers? The next Part examines this issue.
V. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
The federal government could simply require that firms impose
supply-chain contracting requirements on their foreign and domestic
suppliers, but the likely inefficiencies and lack of political viability make
this option unattractive. 189 The minivegetable and potato examples at the
outset of this Article suggest a more efficient and viable option based on
the observation that individuals and firms often have remarkably little
information about the greenhouse gas emissions and energy use associated
with many products. Although these are only anecdotal examples,
numerous others exist. On the consumer front, thousands of gallons of
water are shipped from Fiji to the United States each year, with customers

184. See Cortese, supra note 180; Jad Mouawad, The Greener Guys, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006,
at Cl.
185. See Mouawad, supra note 184.
186. Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 139, at 933, 950-56.
187. See Ericsson, Supplier Environmental Requirements, http://www.ericsson.com/ericsson/
corporatejresponsibility/suppliers/doc/supplierreq-brochure.pdf (last visited July 27, 2008); Ericsson,
Code of Conduct, http://www.ericsson.com/ericsson/corporate responsibility/doc/codeofconduct.pdf
(last visited July 27, 2008).
188. PARRY ET AL., supra note 32, at 1-2 (noting that Tesco recently stated that it will reduce its
carbon footprint by 50% in the next fifteen years).
189. An example of federal regulation of the actions of firms abroad is the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-ff (2000).
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only dimly aware of the associated carbon emissions. 9 ' On the firm front,
Wal-Mart recently discovered that it could save $25 million per year by
adopting a firm-wide policy against idling delivery trucks. 191 UPS
discovered it could save a substantial amount by restricting delivery trucks
from making left turns in the New York metropolitan area. 192 Firms
ultimately may have discovered these efficiencies on their own without
climate change-based prodding, but inducing firms to gather information
about emissions may truncate the time that otherwise would be required to
identify efficiencies throughout the supply chain.
Although firm-level efficiencies alone are unlikely to motivate
sufficient levels of firm behavior, information about emissions also may
have a second effect: it may enable individuals to act on preferences for
emissions reductions through their consumer and civic behavior.
Information disclosure thus may facilitate the application of legal,
economic, and social pressure on firms, whether from government
regulators, consumers, NGOs, investors, or employees.193 This Part
proposes two measures designed to require the collection and disclosure of
the types of information that could induce firms to adopt supply-chain
contracting requirements: corporate carbon footprints and product carbon
labeling.
A. NEW FIRM INCENTIVES
Carbon footprint and product-labeling schemes could be developed
and enforced by public or private entities. 19 4 Government-mandated
schemes may be more widely adopted and better enforced than private
195
schemes, but they also may be more vulnerable to a WTO challenge.
190.
191.

See Fishman, supra note 7.
William J. Holstein, Saving the Earth,and Saving Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, § 3, at

9.
192. Joel Lovell, Left-Hand-Turn Elimination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 80.
193. See Neil A. Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton & Robert A. Kagan, Motivating Management:
Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection, 27 LAW & POL'Y 289, 300-07 (2005); Neil
Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection:
Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 308-10 (2004) [hereinafter
Gunningham et al., Social License]; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as EnvironmentalRegulation:
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001)
(discussing the Toxic Release Inventory and other forms of informational regulation as "pioneering the
systematic use of performance monitoring and benchmarking as regulatory tools").
194. See Vandenbergh, New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 139, at 919-24. NGO-driven private
governance raises numerous questions, including questions about the accountability of NGOs. See, e.g.,
Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the "Unregulated"
Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 963-67 (1996).
195. Government labeling schemes may be more vulnerable to a WTO challenge than private
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Although the federal government has shown little interest to date in
expanding beyond the EPA Energy Star labeling program for appliances,
the governments of some of the most populous states already have adopted
carbon labeling schemes for some products. 196 Similarly, several states
and
have begun to require that firms calculate and report their emissions,
19 7
several federal legislative initiatives are under consideration.
NGOs could stimulate the development of carbon labeling and
corporate carbon footprints by directing lobbying efforts toward
government or private firms. 198 NGO efforts to date have been directed
principally at the development of domestic regulatory measures, such as
efficiency standards and cap-and-trade schemes, but the analysis in this
Article suggests that a concerted effort regarding certain types of
information-disclosure schemes may yield greater emissions reductions
over the long run. The potential for influencing China, and ultimately the
United States, through supply-chain contracting suggests that these
information disclosure efforts may be worthy of substantial commitments
of NGO and government resources.
1. Corporate Carbon Footprints
A viable means of stimulating supply-chain carbon requirements is the
calculation and disclosure of corporate carbon footprints. These footprints
identify the greenhouse gas emissions, generally in carbon dioxideequivalents, associated with a firm. 199 The model for firm-based disclosure
of greenhouse gas emissions is the public disclosure of toxic chemical
releases from industrial facilities, which has been widely hailed as a
of inducing firms to improve their environmental
successful means
20 0
performance.
The principal federal disclosure program is the Toxics Release
schemes. See Pauwelyn, supra note 142, at 12-14.
196. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43200.1 (Deering 2007) (mandating global
warming index label for cars beginning in the 2009 model year); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 191103 (Consol. 2007) (mandating global warming index label for cars beginning in 2010 model year).
See also discussion infra at notes 220-22.
197. See infra notes 204-05.
198. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Competingfor the Public Through the News Media, 14 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 339, 341-42 (2005) (noting public and private targets of the Sierra Club's efforts to
raise average fuel economy standards).
199. Corporate carbon footprints are distinct but based on the same concept as personal carbon
footprints. For a recent study of the carbon calculators used to calculate personal carbon footprints, see
generally J. Paul Padgett et al., A Comparison of Carbon Calculators,28 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT
REv. 106 (2008).
200. See Karkkainen, supra note 193, at 259-61.
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Inventory ("TRI"), which was established soon after the 1984 Bhopal
disaster. 20 1 The statutory and regulatory provisions creating the TRI require
large industrial facilities to disclose their toxic chemical releases on an
annual basis. 20 2 The TRI provisions only require reporting of releases from
industrial facilities, not from suppliers or customers. Empirical studies have
concluded that firms identified in TRI data releases as being among the
highest emitters in their industrial sectors experienced an abnormal
negative effect on firm stock value and subsequently reduced emissions
more than those who were among the lowest emitters, even where
emissions reductions were not mandated by law. 20 3 In short, despite the
lack of any emissions-reductions requirements, TRI information
disclosures appear to have created incentives for firms to reduce emissions.
If appropriately configured, a greenhouse gas emissions-disclosure
scheme modeled on TRI could create incentives for U.S. firms to reduce
their direct emissions and to adopt supply-chain contracting requirements
to reduce emissions from suppliers. Several states have adopted
requirements for facility-specific disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions,
often in carbon dioxide equivalents. 20 4 Federal legislators have introduced
bills with similar requirements. 20 5 Many of these greenhouse gas emissions

201. Seeid. at 259.
202. For a discussion of TRI reporting requirements, see Vandenbergh, Order Without Social
Norms, supra note 34, at 1140-41.
203. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Firms Pollute (and Reduce) Toxic Emissions?
6-7 (2000), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=922491. See also Winston Harrington,
Enforcement Leverage when Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 29, 49 (1988) (noting high
compliance where costs are low even in cases in which penalties are unlikely to be levied and
suggesting that the threat of bad publicity may also incentivize firms to comply in the absence of
penalties). For a review of the empirical literature on the Toxics Release Inventory, see generally Mark
A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement,
30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,245 (2000). See also Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash,
Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging Approach to Environmental Protection, in LEVERAGING
THE

PRIVATE

SECTOR:

MANAGEMENT-BASED

STRATEGIES

FOR

IMPROVING

ENVIRONMENTAL

PERFORMANCE 3, 9-10 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006) (discussing state analogues to
TRI).
204. E.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety Code §
38530(a) (Deering 2007) (requiring the California State Air Resources Board to finalize a reporting
program for firm greenhouse gas emissions by the end of 2007); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited July 27, 2008).
205. See National Greenhouse Gas Registry Act of 2007, S. 1387, 110th Cong. (2007) (amending
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act to include greenhouse gases under the
TRI reporting requirements); Greenhouse Gas Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2651, 11 0th Cong.
(2007) (requiring all publicly traded companies and "significant emitters" of greenhouse gases to report
to the EPA and for the agency to make the data available in a publicly searchable format). See also
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2008) (directing
the EPA to publish a rule requiring all sectors of the economy to report their greenhouse gas
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reporting requirements appear to be designed to provide baseline data for
the imposition of state, regional, or federal cap-and-trade schemes, 20 6 but
they also may generate pressure on firms through TRI-type public
disclosure of emissions.
Nevertheless, these reporting requirements reflect several limitations
of the TRI design. They apply only to large industrial facilities, and also do
not require regulated facilities to report the emissions from suppliers or
customers. As a result, although these greenhouse gas disclosure programs
may generate pressure to reduce facility-specific greenhouse gas emissions,
they are unlikely to generate pressure to reduce emissions from the supply
chain or from the use of the goods produced at the regulated facilities. In
the absence of pressure on suppliers and customers, firms will have
incentives to reduce reported facility-specific emissions not by reducing
total emissions from the life cycle of the product, but' by shifting highemitting production to suppliers or by making goods that are less carbon
intensive to make but more carbon intensive to use.
To induce pressure for supply-chain contracting, firms should be
induced to include emissions from suppliers in their footprint.20 7 In
addition, any carbon footprint disclosure requirements modeled on the TRI
program should apply not only to facilities but also to firms, and the types
of firms should include not only manufacturers but also large retailers.
Many of the firms that have committed to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and have calculated their carbon footprints thus far have
excluded suppliers from their footprint analyses, and leading global and
domestic private carbon-reporting standards do not require inclusion of
suppliers in estimates of a firm's carbon footprint. 2 8 The inclusion of
emissions).
206. See, e.g., Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003); Regional
2005,
Understanding,
Dec.
20,
Initiative,
Memorandum
of
Greenhouse
Gas
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou final 12_20_05.pdf.
207. See WIEDMANN & MINX, supra note 33, at 2 (noting that a point of disagreement regarding
definitions of carbon footprints is "whether the carbon footprint needs to include indirect emissions
embodied in upstream production processes or whether it is sufficient to look at just the direct, on-site
emissions"). Several entities are accounting for customer-produced carbon dioxide emissions. See Press
Release, Middlebury College, Middlebury College Ski Facility Takes Carbon Neutrality to New
at
http://www.middlebury.edu/about/pubaff/
(Oct.
30,
2006),
available
Heights
news releases/2006/news632977987165870677.htm. Others are encouraging suppliers to measure their
own carbon footprints. See Ylan Q. Mui, Wal-Mart Aims to Enlist Suppliers in Green Mission, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 2007, at D02 (describing Wal-Mart's efforts in asking "suppliers to measure their
carbon footprint and find ways to reduce it").
208. See, e.g., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 17, 26,
33 (2006), available at http://www.globalreporting.orgfNR/rdonlyresfED9E9B36-AB54-4DEI-BFF25F735235CA44/0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf (advancing sustainability performance indicators with
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supplier emissions in corporate carbon footprints on a widespread basis
thus may require government, consumer, NGO, or other pressure.2 °9 That
pressure, in turn, will arise only if policymakers, NGOs, and individuals
recognize the potentially central role that low-carbon supply-chain
contracting can play in addressing the climate problem at the global level.
Ideally the footprint requirements not only should include supplier
emissions, but also emissions from the consumption of the goods produced
or sold.2 10 Doing so will reduce the risk that retailers will have incentives to
opt for products that are manufactured with fewer emissions than
comparable products but emit more during use. 2 11 For example, nothing
will be gained if retailers are induced to sell a lawnmower that generates
one ton less greenhouse gases during production than an alternative, yet
emits two tons more during its useful life. Some of the pressure to reduce
emissions from consumption rather than just manufacturing and selling can
be addressed by including consumer emissions in product labels, as
regard to suppliers in the economic (EC6) and human rights (HR2) realms, but asserting that, while
"operational information such as emissions data can be reliably compiled from entities under the control
of an organization, [they] may not be available for a joint venture or a supplier"); THE CLIMATE
REGISTRY, GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL FOR THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING PROGRAM 34 (2008),
available at http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/GRP.pdf (describing as "optional" the
reporting of all upstream emissions); CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT
(CDP5)
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
QUESTIONNAIRE,
http://www.cdproject.net/admin/
cdp5reportingguidance.asp (noting that supplier emissions are included in Scope 3, and only in the
Scope I and Scope 2 levels is reporting required).
209.
Firms that have committed to carbon neutrality often have undertaken a carbon footprint
analysis. See Bus. FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, WHO'S GOING "CARBON NEUTRAL"? (2007),
http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR Carbon-Neutral-Chart.pdf (listing fifteen firms that have achieved
carbon neutrality and thirteen that have made a commitment to achieve carbon neutrality, each
providing supportable claims). Many firms in the United States have calculated their carbon footprint.
E.g., Press Release, The Conference Board, "Carbon Footprint" Gaining Business Attention (Oct. 18,
2006),
available at
http://www.conference-board.org/utilities/pressDetail.cfm?presslD=2985
(reporting that 75% of ninety-two companies surveyed calculated their carbon footprints).
210.
In many cases, firms have not included customers or suppliers in their carbon footprint
calculations. Compare Cortese, supra note 179 (noting Timberland's efforts to include suppliers in
carbon
footprint
analysis),
with
Tesco,
Measuring
Our
Carbon
Footprint,
http://www.tesco.com/climatechange/carbonfootprint.asp (last visited July 27, 2008) (not including
either suppliers or customers in its carbon footprint analysis).
211.
Several types of organizations are accounting for customer- or user-produced carbon dioxide
emissions. See, e.g., Press Release, Middlebury College, supra note 207 (including emissions of skiers
traveling to and from the ski resort in offset calculations). Other companies are proactively encouraging
suppliers to measure their own carbon footprints. See Mui, supra note 207 (describing Wal-Mart's
efforts in asking "suppliers to measure their carbon footprint and find ways to reduce it"). An example
of a firm that has calculated the carbon footprint of the consumption of its goods is Shell, which has
acknowledged that consumption of its petroleum and other products accounts for several percent of
global
greenhouse
gas
emissions.
Shell,
Carbon
Footprint
of
Our
Products,
http://www.shell.con-m/home/Content/responsible-energy/environment/climate-change/carbon-footprint
_products/carbon-footprints.products.html (last visited July 27, 2008).
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discussed below, but including consumer emissions in firm carbon
footprints would reinforce the incentives fostered by the labels.
The China Problem demonstrates the importance of gathering and
reporting information on the entire carbon footprint of a firm, including
212
suppliers and customers, not just the emissions from a particular facility.
A number of authors have noted that the movement of energy-intensive
production from the United States and other developed countries to China
has had the effect of outsourcing greenhouse gas emissions. 213 If firms are
compelled to calculate and disclose their carbon footprints and to include
suppliers in the footprints, they will have additional incentives to impose
carbon requirements on their suppliers and fewer incentives to shift highemitting activities to suppliers.
2. Product Labeling
Public or private product labeling also may increase the supply-chain
incentives for firms, and be more viable in the short term and less
vulnerable to a WTO challenge than a number of other instruments.
Whether public or private, a labeling scheme will need to have several
elements if it is to induce changes in firm behavior sufficient to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The scheme will need to provide sufficient
information to induce consumers and NGOs to apply pressure on the
appropriate targets. 2 14 For example, if the pressure results in reduced
manufacturing emissions in China but increases manufacturing emissions
in another country, the effort will not succeed. As a result, the labels will
need to apply to both domestic and imported goods, not just the latter. This
approach also has the benefit of reducing
the risk that the labeling scheme
2 15
will encounter WTO difficulties.
212.

See WIEDMANN & MINX, supra note 33, at 4 (proposing definition of carbon footprint that

includes direct and indirect emissions "accumulated over the life stages of a product").
213.
See, e.g., Chatteijee, supra note 121, at 4834 (noting that "the boost in imports and
associated consumption by the U.S. has added significantly to the greenhouse-gas emissions of its

trading partners, especially those with poorly enforced environmental regulations, like China"). China
also engages in forms of outsourcing, such as protecting domestic forests at the expense of those in
other countries. Liu & Diamond, supra note 55, at 1184.
214.
See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Hazard Communication: Warnings and Risk,
545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 109-10 (1996) (discussing the shortcomings of labels,
including the difficulty of targeting information to the sophistication of the user and communicating the
appropriate level of risk).
215.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 3, para. 4, Oct. 30, 1847, 61 Stat. A- 1l,55
U.N.T.S. 194 (prohibiting discrimination against like-imported products). See also Edward M. Thomas,
Note, Playing Chicken at the WTO: Defending an Animal Welfare-Based Trade Restriction Under
GATT's Moral Exception, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605, 615 n.91 (2007) ("This area of the law is

changing quickly, and considerations such as consumer preferences are increasingly taken into account
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Similarly, as discussed above, the pressure arising from labels should
result in overall net reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, not just
reductions in emissions from manufacturing. If a measure reduces
manufacturing emissions but increases shipping emissions or emissions
during use of the good, the measure may have no net impact or may even
increase emissions. To ensure that net emissions reductions are achieved,
the labels will need to address the emissions that arise throughout the life
cycle of a good, including production, shipment, marketing, sales, and
use. 216 Calculating life-cycle emissions will not be easy, but the
calculations need not be exact, and as long as perfection is not the goal, it
can be done at a reasonably low cost.
Public and private carbon-labeling efforts are underway around the
world. For example, the British government has announced a new program
"created jointly by [the] Department for Environment, Food, and Rural
Affairs and the Carbon Trust, a government advisory body." 217 The goal is
to induce carbon labeling for all products. 218 Several major brands are
planning to test the Carbon Trust label, with the expectation that more
2 19
companies will join.
In the United States, the federal government could impose labeling
requirements quickly and widely across many sectors. Little legislative or
executive branch activity is underway regarding carbon labeling, however,
and action by a number of states may be more likely in the interim. Several
states have adopted greenhouse gas labeling requirements for specific types
of consumer goods. For example, in 2005 California adopted a requirement

by the WTO in deciding whether two products are 'like' each other."). The WTO considers "evidence
relating to consumers' tastes and habits" in its analysis of whether two products are "like products."
WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products
84-154, WT/DS135/AB/R (Feb. 16, 2001). WTO prohibitions on TBT apply to

measures that focus on product-related processes and production methods ("PPMs") including
"terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements." See Pauwelyn, supra note 142,
at 27 (quoting Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1, par. 1). Labeling schemes may

survive a WTO challenge even if they focus on PPMs if they are nondiscriminatory and "'not more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective."' Id.
216.
(2005).
217.

See Edgar C. Hertwich, Consumption and Industrial Ecology, 9 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY I, 1
Joel Makower, Two

Steps Forward:

London

http://makower.typepad.com/joel-makower/2007/06/london

Goes Carbon

Crazy (June 3,

2007),

goes-car.html.

218.
Id.
219.
lan Herbert, Carbon Footprint of Products to Be Displayed on Label, INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 16, 2007, at H22. Similarly, the Welsh government plans to introduce a label called the
"green standard" which will provide information on each food's environmental impact, concentrating

on how many miles the food must be flown to get to the Welsh markets. Eco-Labeling Could Benefit
All, WESTERN MAIL (Cardiff, Wales), Apr. 17, 2007, at 4.
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that all new cars display carbon dioxide emissions labels starting with the
2009 model year.220 New York also has imposed labeling requirements on
new motor vehicles. 22 1 To date, no state has adopted a broader labeling
program along the lines of the program under development in the United
Kingdom.
In the absence of a public labeling requirement, a private labeling
scheme may be able to generate sufficient consumer and NGO pressure to
induce firms to impose greenhouse gas emissions-reduction requirements
on suppliers. The labeling may occur through inclusion of greenhouse gas
emissions-disclosure requirements in existing labels or new labels managed
by private standard-setting organizations, 222 or through unilateral action by
firms. For instance, in 2006 Timberland added a label to its footwear that
resembled a food nutrition label, and more recently it has moved toward a
simpler "green index tag" approach that measures greenhouse gas
223
emissions on a scale of one to ten.
Other private firms in the United States also have adopted or begun
the process of adopting product carbon labeling. In 2007, Home Depot
introduced one of the largest labeling initiatives in the United States in the
form of an "Eco Options" brand label for almost three thousand
products. 224 The retailer expects the program to include over six thousand
products by 2009, which would include 12% of the chain's sales and make
it the largest labeling program in American retailing. 225 Energy-efficiency
labeling (in the form of products with the Energy Star label) is part of the
effort, although it is unclear whether the effort will extend to greenhouse

220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43200.1 (Deering 2007). Kate Probst has argued that the
federal government should follow California's lead by requiring all new cars and trucks to bear a
"global warming performance" label. See Katherine N. Probst, CombatingGlobal Warming One Car at
a Time: C02 Emissions Labelsfor New Motor Vehicles, RESOURCES, Spring 2006, at 9, 10, availableat
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Resources- 161 _EmissionsLabels.pdf. This label would estimate
the pounds of C02 produced annually for each make and model, place vehicles in five distinct
groupings rated from "best" to "worst," and allow prospective purchasers to make easy comparisons
among alternatives. Id. at 9.
221.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 19-1103 (Consol. 2007).
222. The Consumer Reports website provides information on sixty-seven certifying organizations.
Consumer Reports, Greener Choices Eco-Labels Center, http://www.greenerchoices.org/ecolabels/organizationlndex.cfm (last visited July 28, 2008). For example, the Center for Resource
Solutions enables businesses to qualify to use a "Green-e Logo" on their packaging if they meet certain
renewable energy use criteria. See CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, GREEN-E VERIFICATION REPORT 7
(2005), available at http://www.green-e.org/docs/2005-Green-eVerification-Report-forweb.pdf.
223. Cortese, supra note 180.
224. Michael Barbaro, Home Depot to Display an Environmental Label, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2007, at CI.
225. Id.
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gas emissions labels for products that are not eligible for Energy Star
226
status.
On the international level, British supermarkets lead the private
carbon labeling movement. Britain's top four supermarket chains-Tesco,
Asda, Sainsbury, and Morrisons-have been described as competing to
"out-green one another in the public's eyes." 227 In January of 2007, Tesco,
the largest chain, "announced that it will begin labeling all 70,000 products
on its shelves with the amount of carbon generated from the production,
transport, and consumption of those items." 228 Marks & Spencer
announced a plan to be carbon neutral by 2012, in part through the
adoption of a carbon labeling scheme. 229 The print industry in the United
Kingdom also recently announced a new "eco-label campaign" that will
disclose the life-cycle carbon emissions of each product.2 3 °
B.

INFLUENCE OF CARBON FOOTPRINTS AND LABELING

1. Firm Efficiencies
As the potato example suggests, incentives to gather and disclose
information may lead firms to identify efficiencies.23 1 Management focus
on the energy use associated with buying potatoes by the pound did not
occur until greenhouse gas emissions concerns induced the potato chip

226. See id. Another firm has taken the approach of bundling its product with emissions offsets to
generate a "carbon-balanced" product. First Carbon-Balanced Retail Product Announced,
GREENBIZ.COM, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2007/01/22/first-carbon-balanced-retailproduct-announced (discussing the efforts of Karcher USA, a manufacturer of pressure washers).
227. Makower, supra note 217. The race could be argued to be roughly analogous to the
"politicians' dilemma" confronted by Richard Nixon and Ed Muskie in the 1972 presidential election.
See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution:
The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 324-29 (1985).
228. Adam Stein, Terrapass Blog, British Supermarket Chain to "Carbon Label" All Products
(Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.terrapass.com/blog/posts/british-superma. The National Consumer Council
recently concluded that of the eight major British supermarkets, Waitrose was the friendliest to the
environment. SUE DIBB, NAT'L CONSUMER COUNCIL, GREENING SUPERMARKETS: How
SUPERMARKETS CAN HELP MAKE GREENER SHOPPING EASIER 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ncc.org.uk/nccpdf/poldocs/NCC132rr-greening-supermarkets.pdf, Rebecca Smithers, How
Green Is Your Supermarket? It Could Try Harder, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 14, 2006, at 5, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/sep/14/food.lifeandhealth (discussing the National
Consumer Council's report).
229. Marks & Spencer Launches 200 Million Pound Eco Plan, GREENBIz, Jan. 16, 2007,
http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2007/01/l 6/marks-spencer-launches-200-million-pound-eco-plan.
230. Adam Hooker, New Label Set to Show Print's Carbon Output, PRINTWEEK (U.K.), May 3,
2007, at 9.
231. See PARRY ET AL., supra note 32, at I (describing the supply chain as "one of the most
pervasive places where energy can be conserved").
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producer to examine the emissions from its supply chain. 23 2 Examples of
supply-chain contracting inefficiencies that have been detected in the
United States and the United Kingdom suggest the magnitude and types of
inefficiencies that may be identified in China. In the United States, WalMart, as discussed above, recently began to focus on the energy use in its
operations and identified $25 million in annual savings by adopting a
corporate ban on delivery truck idling. A recent supply-chain analysis
conducted by the Carbon Trust in the United Kingdom concluded that in
some cases 80% of a retail product's emissions arise from the supply chain
rather than the retailer's operations.23 3
Despite the opportunities for efficiency enhancements, the prospect of
savings from greater supply-chain efficiency alone will be insufficient to
induce China and the United States to adopt and implement emissionsreductions targets. To do so also will require individuals to exert pressure
through consumer and civic behavior, as discussed below.
2. Individual Consumer and Civic Behavior
The journey of the minivegetables demonstrates the type of activities
that may not occur if customers have adequate information. The savings on
labor costs presumably exceeded the energy costs of intercontinental air
freighting of chives, minivegetables, and plastic packaging. The value of
the vegetables may have been far less to image-conscious consumers,
however, if they became aware of the greenhouse gas emissions associated
with their preparation. The shipment of water from Fiji may follow a
similar pattern. Although certainly not all, many consumers may be
unwilling to buy goods with extremely high carbon emissions. With
adequate information, their preferences may force the internalization of
234
some of the climate change costs of jet fuel and other fossil fuels.
Information about carbon emissions also may enable many consumers
to achieve outcomes through market behavior that they are unable to
achieve through civic behavior. Although individuals may be more likely to
act altruistically when they conceive of themselves as citizens instead of as
232. Similarly, management focus is a possible reason for the reductions in toxic chemical
releases that were cost beneficial and preexisted TRI release reporting. See Konar & Cohen, supra note
203, at 15. See also Harrington, supra note 203, at 49.
233. See CARBON TRUST, supra note 5, at 15 (noting case study involving the Daily Mirror).
234.

See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the

Regulation ofConsumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 637-38 (2004). Although estimates vary, one
recent estimate places the social cost of climate change at $85 per metric ton of carbon dioxide. See HM
TREASURY, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE xvi (2006), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./media/4/3/ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
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consumers, 235 it is unclear whether this phenomenon holds true regarding
climate change, or, even if it does, whether consumer pressure on firms will
be greater than the limited citizen pressure that gets filtered through the
political system. A variety of sources suggest that the current stance of the
U.S. government is only partially reflective of the views of many
Americans. For example, despite opposition at the federal level, more than
fifteen states representing roughly half of the population have sought to
adopt greenhouse gas standards for private motor vehicles.2 36 In addition, a
large percentage of the population expresses concern about climate change
and states support for government action to reduce emissions, but at the
237
same time, expresses deep reservations about taxes and big government.
The private consumer response to climate change thus may closely track
Americans' desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with a minimum of
government involvement.
Yet the literature is mixed on whether consumers will bear higher
costs for low-carbon products. Consumers in the United States have
238
demonstrated only limited willingness to pay more for green goods,
although Europeans have demonstrated a willingness to pay somewhat
more. 23 9 A number of studies suggest that consumers in the United States
in the past have opted for goods with green characteristics only if the price
and other key features are roughly equal or there is a small price
235. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 109091 (2000) ("[T]here may be differences between the choices people make as consumers and the choices
that they make as citizens .... The context of citizenship may evoke other-regarding or altruistic values
that are not reflected in private choices.").
236. See Richard Simon & Janet Wilson, EPA Denies California's Right to Mandate Emissions,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at Al.
237. John M. Broder & Marjorie Connelly, Public Says Warming Is a Problem, but Remains Split
on Response, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A20 (citing a New York Times/CBS News poll).
238. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS IN
THE U.S. iii (1993) (noting that "studies also show that ... many consumers often do not act on their
own assertion that they would preferentially purchase products that are less damaging to the
environment"); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS
WORLDWIDE 30-31 (1993) (concluding that consumer interest in ecolabels "does not necessarily reflect
the actual purchasing choices that consumers make"); Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and
Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 149 n. 1 (1993); James Salzman, Informing
the Green Consumer: The Debate over the Use and Abuse of Environmental Labels, J. INDUS.
ECOLOGY, April 1997, at 11, 13 (noting that effect of ecolabeling programs "still has not been answered
empirically," although labels may influence product design); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
EnvironmentalRegulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 96-97 (2001) (reviewing the effects of ecolabels on
consumer behavior).
239. See, e.g., Thomas Bue Bjomer, Lars GAin Hansen & Clifford S. Russell, Environmental
Labeling and Consumer's Choice-An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Nordic Swan, 47 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 411, 428 (2004) (concluding that consumers' marginal willingness to pay was
in the 13/o-18% range for toilet paper).
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premium. 240 Too much information or contradictory information also may
act as barriers. For example, dozens of different types of consumer labels
are available in Europe, and the profusion of labels has created a
24
phenomenon described as "label fatigue." '
In recent years, however, consumers in developed countries have
demonstrated a willingness to pay a price premium for a number of
environmental and other social welfare-regarding attributes of products.
Empirical studies suggest that environmental labeling is effective in
creating demand for premium-priced products in certain niche markets
when consumers perceive superior quality in a product, as is the case with
organic foods, or when consumers feel that there is an actual environmental
impact stemming from a purchase (that is, their purchases will affect a
specific environmental outcome). 242 Environmental labeling in some cases
has had an influence on nonniche products, such as the "dolphin-safe tuna"
label, which has been credited with reviving the canned tuna market in the
United States in the early- to mid-1990s. 243 Similarly, the organic foods
market is growing rapidly in part through the efforts of large discount firms
such as Wal-Mart, the largest grocer in North America, which describes its
effort as "democratizing sustainability." 2"
The global market for fair trade coffee provides another example. The
fair trade coffee market was $2.2 billion in 2006, a 42% increase from the
prior year. 245 The growth in fair trade coffee sales tracks the growth in
240. See, e.g., Paul C. Stem, Information, Incentives, and ProenvironmentalConsumer Behavior,
22 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 461, 467-68 (1999) (examining limited consumer response to green appeals);
Roy C. Andersen & Eric N. Hansen, Determining Consumer Preferences for Ecolabeled Forest
Products: An Experimental Approach, J. FORESTRY, June 2004, at 28, 29-30 (concluding that wood
products with ecolabels outsell others, but not when priced at a 2% premium). But see Jeffrey R. Blend
& Eileen 0. van Ravenswaay, Measuring Consumer Demandfor EcolabeledApples, 81 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1072, 1076 (1999) (finding that over 40% of households would be willing to buy ecolabeled
apples at a $0.40 price premium).
241. See, e.g., Clark Williams-Deny, An Organic,Local Thanksgiving, SIGHTLINE DAILY, Nov. 5,
2007, http://www.daily.sightline.org/dailyscore/archive/2007/l 1/05/organic-local-thanksgiving.
242. See, e.g., Jill J. McCluskey & Maria L. Loureiro, Consumer Preferences and Willingness to
Pay for Food Labeling: A Discussion of Empirical Studies, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RESEARCH 95, 96
(2003).
243. See Mario F. Teisl, Brian Roe & Robert L. Hicks, Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence
from Dolphin-Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 339, 355-57 (2002). Interestingly, the
consumer response followed an S-shaped curve, with highly informed and interested customers acting
promptly, followed by much wider customer response several years later. Id.
244. Amanda Griscom Little, Don't Discount Him: An Interview with Wal-Mart CEO H. Lee
Scott, GRIST, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.grist.orglnews/maindish/2006/04/12/griscom-little/index.html.
245. Andrew Downie, Fair Trade In Bloom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at Cl (noting the growing
demand for fair trade coffee among consumers and activists and the 20% price premium some growers
have received). Coffee growers in some countries are receiving a smaller premium. Id.
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public information: awareness of fair trade products in the United States
increased from 12% in 2004 to 27% in 2006.246 Fair trade coffee also has
expanded outside of the high-end luxury market and is now the house
brand at Sam's Club, with other fair trade coffee sellers including Dunkin'
trade is the only coffee sold in its New
Donuts, McDonald's (where fair
2 47
Starbucks.
and
England stores),
Although consumer price elasticity is unclear, by purchasing fair trade
coffee on a large scale stores such as Sam's Club have been able to keep
the price premium small. Sam's Club has done so in part by reducing the
number of intermediaries such as packers, traders, shippers, and warehouse
providers. 248 In addition, if the environmental amenity sought by
consumers is a good that is manufactured with less carbon-intensive (and
thus often more efficient) production, the price premium may not be great
for some low-carbon goods.
Moreover, past experience may not be predictive of future consumer
behavior. In the last two decades, climate change has been largely a matter
of complex, inaccessible predictions based on computer modeling,
combined with clumsy attempts to popularize the science. 249 More recently,
news accounts that include credible, vivid images of monster hurricanes,
the Arctic ice in retreat, 250 and polar bears in distress 251 have become
common. If the IPCC's analysis of future climate effects is accurate, the
events that generate these images will become more frequent and vivid
over the next several decades. In some cases, vivid events may be
occurring more quickly than anticipated even by the IPCC. For example,
recent news accounts suggest that the Arctic ice cap may disappear entirely
during the summer within the next few decades, 252 an event that would be
roughly fifty years earlier than initially predicted and one that would create
images with the characteristics that social and behavioral scientists find
253
likely to motivate behavior change.
Initial signs of changes in consumer behavior regarding climate
change can be found in Europe and the United States. The market for low246.

Id.

247.
248.

Id.
Id.

249.
See, e.g., THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW (Twentieth Century Fox 2004).
250.
Andrew C. Revkin, Arctic Melt Unnerves the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at F l.
251.
Id.
252.
See id. (noting prediction by Wieslaw Maslowski of the Naval Postgraduate School).
253.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 75 (Gary D. Brewer & Paul C. Stem eds., 2005) (listing
characteristics of information that induces behavior change).
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carbon goods is growing rapidly in Europe, where firms ranging from
BMW 254 (which is offering an automatic anti-idling device in even its
lowest-end models) to many British grocers 2 55 (which are committing to
reduce corporate emissions) have responded in the last several years to
consumer pressure. Another indication of the growing consumer support
for purchasing goods that address climate change concerns is that more
than thirty private firms and NGOs in Europe and the United States now
sell retail carbon offsets. 256 The offsets enable individuals to offset their
carbon emissions by paying for capture of methane from landfills, wind
farms, and other projects. The voluntary carbon-offset market grew from
$6 million in 2005 to over $100 million in 2006.257
3. Other Influences
The information generated by corporate carbon footprints and product
carbon labeling also may affect firms through a range of influences that
258
have been described as constituting firms' "social license" to operate.
For example, the information may stimulate NGO-led boycotts 259 and
efforts to undermine firms' reputations if they fail to adopt supply-chain
contracting requirements. 260 Socially responsible investors may begin to
254.

See Vito J. Racanelli, Luxury Autos 2007: Green Machine, BARRON'S, Sept. 24, 2007, at 33,

33.
255.
See, e.g., PARRY ET AL., supra note 32, at 1; Marks & Spencer Launches 200 Million Pound
Eco Plan,supra note 229.
256.
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 26, at 1719-20.
257.
James Kanter, Guilt-FreePollution. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at CI.
258.
Gunningham et al., Social License, supra note 193, at 308-10. See also PARRY ET AL., supra
note 32, at I (noting concerns driving recent supply-chain energy conservation activity); Irene
Henriques & Perry Sadorsky, The Determinants of an Environmentally Responsive Firm: An Empirical
Approach, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 381, 384 (1996) (examining shareholder, employee, and
management issues).
259.
See Dennis E. Garrett, The Effectiveness of Marketing Policy Boycotts: Environmental
Opposition to Marketing, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1987, at 46, 49 (suggesting that in addition to direct
economic pressure, image pressure and policy commitment play an influential role in firm responses to
boycotts); Robert Innes, A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect
Competition, 116 ECON. J. 355, 361-62 (2006). But see Philippe Delacote, Are Consumer Boycotts
Effective? 3-4 (2008), http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1016773) (concluding that
imperfect information, consumer demand for consumption, transaction costs, and free rider problems
reduce the likelihood of success of boycotts); Konar & Cohen, supra note 203, at 29 (failing to find
significant effects on environmental performance from consumer pressure in study of 520 firms).
260.
See, e.g., David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy,
16 J. EcON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 599, 603-04 (2007); Henriques & Sadorsky, supra note 258, at 393
(concluding based on the results of a Canadian empirical study that firms "down-play" the effect of
consumer and neighborhood pressure, but that these groups have a "significant impact on firms'
decisions to formulate environmental plans"); Sheoli Pargal et al., Formaland Informal Regulation of
Industrial Pollution: Comparative Evidence from Indonesia and the United States, 11 WORLD BANK
ECON. REV. 433, 448 (1997) (finding a "powerful role for informal regulation" based on community
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view supply-chain contracting requirements regarding greenhouse gas
emissions as an important indicator of firm social responsibility.26 ' Firms
may believe that their supply-chain contracting will influence regulators'
decisions regarding new regulations, enforcement activity, and
permitting.

262

Finally, the information generated by these schemes may influence the
norms of corporate managers. The influence of norms is very difficult to
identify empirically and to translate into general observations that can
inform legal remedies. 263 Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that when
the decisional space is available, some managers' behavior reflects
personal and social norms, and it does so in ways that are important for
predicting how firms will react to information regarding product- and firm264
level greenhouse gas emissions.
In particular, the recent behavior of a number of managers presents
intriguing anecdotal information that norms may be having a strong effect
on firm responses to climate change. For example, many of the firms that
have taken public stands in favor of firm or societal greenhouse gas
reductions are led by executives who appear to be driven by normative
considerations. Perhaps the best example is Rupert Murdoch, whose News
Corporation owns Fox News but also has adopted carbon neutrality.2 65
Murdoch's son is a strong environmentalist. 26 6 Goldman Sachs adopted a
ability to pressure polluting factories).
261. Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market
Incentivesfor CorporateEnvironmental Performance 74-76 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Inst. for Law &
Econ.,
Research
Paper No. 05-16, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=725103.
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263. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV.
1781, 1788-91 (2000).
264. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality:
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 549, 575 (1996) (finding
based on empirical study that when moral beliefs are strong, other factors were "virtually superfluous");
Aseem Prakash, Why Do Firms Adopt "'Beyond-Compliance" Environmental Policies?, 10 BUS.
STRATEGY & ENV'T 286, 296 (2001) (noting the importance of personal preferences in management);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate
Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003) (reviewing empirical studies and
proposing typology of norms likely to influence managers' environmental compliance decisionmaking).
265. Louise Story, The Hidden Life of Paper and Its Impact on the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2006, at C3.
266. Ronald Grover, The Murdoch Who Could Be King, BUSINESSWEEK, June 25, 2007, at 66, 66
("At a moment when corporations are at last preaching the benefits of environmentalism, James
[Murdoch] is prodding his father to go green. News Corp.'s May 10 announcement that it would be
carbon-neutral by 2010 is modeled on James' own initiatives at BSkyB that cut carbon emissions 20%,
including software that powers down idle set-top boxes.").
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strong environmental policy during the leadership of Henry Paulson, who
also chaired the Nature Conservancy board of directors. 267 Wal-Mart's
ecoawakening is certainly influenced by factors unrelated to its managers'
norms, but it also appears to have been influenced by the trips that one of
the Waltons took to ecologically sensitive areas with the head of
Conservation International.2 68 Additionally, a growing number of chief
executive officers have remarked about the effects of climate change data
on their conscience. 269 These statements could be self-serving marketing
ploys or genuine but incorrect statements of their motives, but they also
could signal that firm behavior, when confronting an issue with the
potential harms presented by climate change, will be more influenced by
managers' norms, and thus by information about emissions, than standard
accounts would predict.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests how information collection and disclosure can
facilitate a private market response that will reduce China's near-term
economic incentive to emit greenhouse gases. The proposed remedy will
not reverse the balance of incentives on its own, but it will add an
important additional incentive. It will generate private pressure on Chinese
manufacturers to make emissions reductions directly and to pressure the
Chinese government to make the investments and policy changes necessary
to achieve widespread reductions.
The proposed solution also will have an effect on the U.S. political
climate and its incentives. Reductions in Chinese emissions will undermine
opposition to U.S. reduction efforts to the extent the opposition is based on
China's failure to act. In addition, carbon labeling and carbon footprint
schemes that induce supply-chain contracting requirements also may
educate the American population about U.S. emissions. Consumer, NGO,
and other pressures thus may lead to U.S. emissions reductions from the
same types of efficiency gains and other steps as will occur in China. In
combination, these effects may induce the pas de deux between China and
267. See Goldman Sachs Environmental Policy Framework, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/
citizenship/environnent/policy-framework.pdf (last visited July 30, 2008). See also Press Release,
Nature Conservancy, Henry M. Paulson Elected Chairman of the Nature Conservancy Board of
Governors (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.nature.org/pressroom/press/pressl 315.html.
268. Ylan Q. Mui, Wal-Mart Extends Its Influence to Washington: Under Siege, RetailerEngages
Opponents, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2007, at A01.

269. See, e.g., Jane L. Levere, A Law to Cut Emissions? Deal With It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006,
at C3 (quoting Peter A. Darbee, president, CEO, and chairman of PG&E as being driven by his
conscience to address global warming).
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the United States to come to a swift and positive conclusion.
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